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Why Courts Should Forbid "Minority
Coalition" Plaintiffs under Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act Absent Clear
Congressional Authorization
ChristopherE. Skinnellt

Voting rights litigation has always been among the most
complicated areas of the law. It is a field that does not lend itself
to easy judicial standards, a fact that led Justice Frankfurter to
urge his judicial brethren not to enter the "political thicket" many
years ago.1 Even had the judiciary been inclined to take his advice,' political developments made such abstention impossible. In
1965 Congress passed the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"), 3 making
voting rights a proper subject of judicial supervision. But the difficulties described by Frankfurter persist. And, as if the prototypical bipolar voting rights case with a white majority and a
black minority were not complicated enough, the last decade has
brought a whole array of new questions about what to do when
more than one statutorily protected group enters the mix.'
One such question facing federal courts is whether two or
more minority groups may combine, or "aggregate," themselves
into one substantial minority coalition for purposes of challenging
voting systems and practices under Section 2 of the VRA,6 or
whether each legislatively protected group must bring such a
t B.A. 1999, Claremont McKenna College; J.D. Candidate 2003, University of
Chicago.
See Colegrove v Green, 328 US 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion) (arguing that
voting rights suits were generally beyond the competence of the courts and that "[clourts
ought not to enter this political thicket").
2 It was not, of course, so inclined. In Baker v Carr, 369 US 186,
209-10 (1962), the
Supreme Court ignored Frankfurter's warning, holding that voting rights cases were
proper subjects ofjudicial intervention.
3 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub L No 89-110, 79 Stat 437 (1965), codified as
amended at 42 USC §§ 1971, 1973-1973ff-6 (1994).
4 For an example of such questions see Florence Adams, Latinos and Local Representation: ChangingRealities,Emerging Theories 19-24 (Garland 2000).
5 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Title I, § 2, at 854 as amended by the Voting Rights
Act
Amendments of 1982, Pub L No 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat 134 (1982), and codified at 42 USC
§ 1973 et seq (1994).
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claim separately. The federal circuit courts have split on this
question,' and the Supreme Court has expressly refused to rule
on the issue.7
Aggregation of minority groups is not a matter of interest
only to academics. A great deal more is at stake than the convenience of parties or the courts. The approach the courts adopt in
addressing aggregation can mean the difference between a successful Section 2 challenge and a dismissal on the grounds that
the plaintiff class is insufficiently large. In the latter scenario, a
court would hold that the plaintiffs did not suffer a legally cognizable harm because no alternative system would have produced a
better result."
Much of the argument in the courts, and almost all of the
scholarship on this subject, has focused on the question of Congress's purpose under Section 2 with respect to minority coalitions." Lawyers and academic commentators have tended to focus
their analysis on the text and legislative history of Section 2,
without producing wholly satisfactory results. Neither the advocates nor the opponents of aggregation contend that the text of
Section 2 specifically addresses this question.1' Nor do they con-

' Compare Campos v City of Baytown, 840 F2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir 1988) (permitting
aggregation on the grounds that blacks and Hispanics in Texas shared a common history
of political repression), with Nixon v Kent County, 76 F3d 1381, 1387-90 (6th Cir 1996)
(en banc) (prohibiting such aggregation on the grounds that neither a faithful reading of
the text of the VRA, nor its legislative history, nor sound policy considerations favored
allowing such aggregation).
' Growe v Emison, 507 US 25, 41 (1993) ('[alssuming (without deciding) that it was
permissible for the District Court to combine distinct ethnic and language minority groups
for purposes of assessing compliance with § 2").
6 See text accompanying notes 33 and 34.
6 See generally Sebastian Geraci, Comment, The Case Against Allowing Multiracial
Coalitions to File Section 2 Dilution Claims, 1995 U Chi Legal F 389 (stressing that
congressional intent and the VRA's purpose militate against aggregation); Angelo N.
Ancheta and Kathryn K Imahara, Multi-Ethnic Voting Rights: Defining Vote Dilution In
Communities of Color, 27 USF L Rev 815 (1993) (arguing for aggregation); Rick G.
Strange, Application of the Voting Rights Act to Communities Containing Two or More
Minority Groups-When is the Whole Greaterthan the Sum of the Parts?,20 Tex Tech L
Rev 95 (1989) (arguing for aggregation, but only after the plaintiff class has met a
heightened burden of proof with respect to the cohesiveness of the proposed coalition).
10 See, for example, Nixon, 76 F3d at 1386 (Keith dissenting) ("Even the most cursory
examination reveals that § 2 of the Voting Rights Act does not mention minority coalitions, either expressly or conceptually."); id at 1394 (Keith dissenting) (advocating aggregation and noting that "the Voting Rights Act does not indicate whether a coalition of
African-Americans and Hispanic-Americans may constitute a single 'class of citizens protected by [the Voting Rights Act]').
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tend that there is any evidence of specific intent in the legislative
history with respect to minority coalitions."
With respect to broader purpose, however, critics of aggregation certainly believe that congressional intent is clear."2 They
point to the VRA's textual silence, explicit or implicit, on the
question of minority coalitions as an indication that Congress
could not have intended such coalitions,' and to the fact that in
the one circumstance in which any form of aggregation was addressed in the VRA, Congress disallowed it." They further argue
that aggregation would be a "radical departure from the VRA's
purpose of ending racial discrimination," making it a mere tool of
political interests."
Conversely, proponents of aggregation argue that Congress
clearly intended minority coalitions." Proponents of aggregation
contend that nothing in the VRA prohibits minority coalitions;"
that Congress cited at least one minority coalition case in the legislative history of 1975 amendments to the VRA;" and that minority coalitions would be consistent with Congress's stated purpose of extending the scope of VRA protection with the 1982

See id at 1387 (majority) ("[N]either party contends that the extensive legislative
history of the Act contains any direct evidence that Congress even contemplated coalition
suits, far less intended them. The committee report for the 1975 amendments does not
make any reference, implicit or explicit, to the issue of aggregation."). See also Strange, 20
Tex Tech L Rev at 111-12 & n 99 (cited in note 9) ("Congress provided no answer in either
the Act's wording or in accompanying committee reports [concerning aggregation].").
12 See, for example, Nixon, 76 F3d at 1386 (examining
the text and legislative history
and determining that neither supports minority coalitions under Section 2).
13 See id at 1386 ("Even the most cursory examination reveals that §
2 of the Voting
Rights Act does not mention minority coalitions, either expressly or conceptually.").
" See id at 1387 n 7 (noting that "Congress has only once addressed the aggregation
of separately protected groups and then in the negative"), citing 42 USC § 1973b(fX3)
(1994) (stating that language minorities may not aggregate their numbers for purposes of
meeting the threshold numeric requirements for foreign-language ballots of 42 USC
§ 1973b).
15 See, for example, Geraci, 1995 U Chi Legal F at 398 (cited in note 9) ("The
real
purpose, therefore, in protecting a multiracial coalition, would be to protect ideas, not an
historically oppressed racial minority.").
16 See, for example, Nixon, 76 F3d at 1393 (Keith dissenting) (contending
that the
basic purpose of the VRA supports minority coalitions).
17 See id at 1397-99 (Keith dissenting).
" See id at 1395 (Keith dissenting) ("In its discussion of the history of discrimination
and the need for expanded protection in the 1975 amendments, the Senate cited at least
one case in which African-Americans and Hispanics brought a joint claim under the voting
rights act."), citing Wright v Rockefeller, 376 US 52 (1964).
"
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amendments." Positive action on the part of Congress would re0
solve this dilemma, but none appears immediately forthcoming.
Rather than rehash this extensive body of commentary, this
Comment takes as its initial premise the idea that because the
text and legislative history are insufficiently determinate, courts
should focus their attention to two other traditional tools of statutory interpretation-substantive canons of construction," and
consequential arguments---to ultimately resolve this impasse.

Relying on these two sources of interpretation, this Comment
maintains that, in the absence of a clear congressional enactment
to the contrary, courts should refuse to sanction minority coalition plaintiffs in Section 2 actions. Unique aspects of voting
rights litigation would make the consequences of aggregation
overwhelmingly undesirable.
Part I briefly summarizes the development of the federal circuit courts' division over aggregation. Part II analyzes the appli19 Id at 1399 (Keith dissenting) ("[The Nixon majority's reading] of 'protected class' is

inconsistent with the purpose of the 1982 amendments to extend application of the Act.").
A search of the Lexis database, "Congressional Full Text Bills-Current Congress"
on October 28, 2002, for <'voting rights act and ((nixon or kent) or aggregat! or minority
coalition)'> produced twenty-five results, none of which were relevant.
21 While there are a number of possible variations on the traditional tools, these
three-text, legislative history, and substantive canons of construction -are assuredly
among them. See, for example, Carlos E. Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 NC L Rev 585, 720 (1996) ("In the first step the court uses traditional tools of
statutory interpretation, such as text, legislative history, and canons and presumptions of
construction, to determine the range of plausible meanings to ambiguous statutory
clauses."); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the RegulatoryState, 103 Harv L Rev
405, 437 (1989) (discussing the "use of traditional tools of statutory construction," such as
text (including the statute's structure), legislative history, and "interpretive principles...
properly invoked to press language in particular directions").
22 Whether or not, as a normative matter, one believes that resort to policy arguments
is appropriate, as a descriptive matter policy consequences are a traditional tool of statutory construction. See Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretations
of Law, 1989 Duke L J 511, 515 ("To begin with, it seems to me that the 'traditional tools
of statutory construction' include not merely text and legislative history but also, quite
specifically, the consideration of policy consequences. Indeed, that tool is so traditional
that it has been enshrined in Latin: 'Ratio est legis anima; mutata legis ratione mutatur et
lex.' (The reason for the law is its soul; when the reason for the law changes, the law
changes as well.')"); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation:
An Empirical Analysis, 70 Tex L Rev 1073, 1096 (1992) ("It may be surprising, however,
that the data reveal that the Court frequently and openly invokes pragmatic or policy
considerations to support statutory results.").
Congress's intent with respect to the amended Section 2 has proven to be a hotly
debated topic on the Supreme Court. As Justice O'Connor has recognized, "[t]here is an
inherent tension between what Congress wished to do and what it wished to avoid [in
passing the 1982 amendments to Section 21." Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 84 (1986)
(O'Connor concurring). See also Holder v Hall, 512 US 874, 933-34 (1994) (Thomas concurring) (noting considerable ambiguities in the legislative history of the 1982 amendments).
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cability of the federalism canon in Gregory v Ashcroft24 to the VRA
and argues that, while the legal applicability of Gregory to the
VRA is still unresolved after Chisom v Roemer,25 the reasons that
have been offered to date for exempting the VRA from the operation of the Gregory canon are unpersuasive. Part III reviews the
policy consequences of permitting minority coalitions, arguing
that those consequences further support a rule against aggregation. It further evaluates the policy justifications put forth by aggregation's proponents and argues that they fail to establish that
minority coalitions should be permitted. Part IV rejects the suggestion that courts should adopt a nuanced standard of cohesiveness among a proposed, aggregated plaintiff class to determine
when minority coalitions are appropriate, rather than adhering to
a bright-line rule against aggregation. Finally, Part V suggests
that courts can ameliorate the harsher results of forbidding aggregation under the VRA by permitting aggregation in vote dilution suits brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Since plaintiffs challenging voting systems
under the Equal Protection Clause are required to show discriminatory intent, rather than merely disparate impact,27 the risk of
either party using aggregation as a sword, rather than a shield, is
substantially decreased.

I. THE DIVIDE OVER AGGREGATION IN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS

Section 2 of the VRA prohibits states and their political subdivisions from denying or abridging the right of any U.S. citizen
to vote on the basis of race, color, or inclusion in a language minority (that is, people whose first language is not English).28 The
Section further provides:
A violation of [this prohibition] is established if, based on
the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or
political subdivision are not equally open to participation
24

25
26

501 US 452 (1991).
501 US 380 (1991).
Plaintiffs can bring vote dilution suits under Section 2 of the VRA or under the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, for example, City of Mobile v
Bolden, 446 US 55, 62 (1980) (holding that vote dilution claims brought under the Equal
Protection Clause require a showing of discriminatory intent to succeed).
27

Id.

2B

42 USC § 1973(a).
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by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a)
of this section in that its members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their
choice.n
Exactly what constitutes a protected "class of citizens" is at
the heart of the debate over aggregation. No one questions that
blacks or Asians or Native Americans or Hispanics are among the
protected classes."0 The real question is whether, for example,
combinations of blacks and Asians, blacks and Hispanics, or Hispanics and Native Americans also constitute protected classes.
The answer to this question matters a great deal in some instances because of the test announced by the Supreme Court in
the seminal VRA case of Thornburg v Gingles.3" To press a successful vote dilution challenge to a multimember district2 system
under Section 2, plaintiffs must meet a three-pronged test:
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that
it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. .. . Second,
the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive. .. . Third, the minority must be able to
demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it-in the absence of special circumstances,
such as the minority candidate running unopposed... 3
usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."
Courts have held that failure to meet any one of the three
prongs is fatal to a plaintiff's case.3 ' Furthermore, the Gingles
42 USC § 1973(b) (emphasis added).
30 See Nixon v Kent County, 76 F3d 1381, 1389 (6th Cir 1996) (en banc) (listing groups
to which the VRA unquestionably applies).
s 478 US 30 (1986).
2 "A multimember district is any district in which voters elect more than one candi2

date to a governmental body." Daniel R. Ortiz, Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawful At-Large Systems, 92 Yale L J 144, 145 n 8 (1982). It can be contrasted
with a single-member districting system in which "voters are divided into as many separate districts as there are seats in the elected body." Id at 144 n 4.
'
Gingles, 478 US at 50-51 (footnotes and internal citations omitted).
14 See, for example, Overton v City of Austin, 871 F2d 529, 538
(5th Cir 1989) ("We
need not address all of [the plaintiffs'] contentions, however, because failure to establish
any single criterion of [Gingles] is fatal to their case."); McNeil v Springfield Park District,
851 F2d 937, 942 (7th Cir 1988) ("To pass the summary judgment threshold, ... the
Gingles preconditions [must be] met.").
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framework is not limited to multimember districts; the Court has
extended the Gingles test to encompass other challenged voting
systems such as single-member districts and majority-minority
districts."
To satisfy the first Gingles prong, some plaintiffs seek to
combine minority groups into a coalition if no single group would
itself be able to constitute a majority in one district. For example,
in Nixon v Kent County,6 blacks alone only constituted a functional majority in one Board of Commissioners district.7 When
black voters were combined with Hispanic voters, however, the
total minority percentage would have been sufficient to permit
the minority class to control two of the County's districts.n Therefore, the plaintiffs would have made a prima facie case of vote
dilution against a proposed plan that gave minorities control of
only one district. 9 If, however, the court forbad aggregation (as it
ultimately did) there would be no grounds for a suit: the black
population constituted a majority in one district, and they controlled one district."0 Because the Hispanic population did not
amount to a majority in any district under any plausible redistricting plan, Hispanics could not complain that they did not control a commission seat. 1
A. Early Cases: The Assumed Validity of Aggregation
Prior to Nixon, the weight of legal authority came down exclusively on the side of permitting minority coalitions. Most
courts, including the Supreme Court, assumed without explicitly
deciding that such combinations were acceptable for purposes of
vote dilution suits under Section 2." As a practical matter, how35 Growe v Emison, 507 US 25, 40-41 (1993) (single-member districts); Voinovich v
Quilter, 507 US 146, 158 (1993) (majority-minority districts). See also Brooks v Miller, 158
F3d 1230, 1239 (11th Cir 1998) (applying Gingles criteria to Section 2 claim challenging a
majority vote requirement). A majority-minority district is one "in which a majority of the
population is a member of a specific minority group." Voinovich, 507 US at 149.
36 76 F3d 1381 (6th Cir 1996) (en
banc).
37 Id at 1384. Part of plaintiffs' challenge was to a decision
by the Kent County Board
of Commissioners to reduce the number of districts from 21 to 19. Plaintiffs could have
controlled two seats if the old system of 21 seats was retained. Id.
38 Id.
39
40

41

Nixon, 76 F3d at 1384.

Id.
Id.

42 See, for example, Growe v Emison, 507 US 25, 41 (1993) (stressing that,
assuming
coalition suits were to be permitted, 'proof of minority political cohesion is all the more
essential" and dismissing the case for failure to meet that proof); Badillo v City of Stockton, 956 F2d 884, 891 (9th Cir 1992) (same); Romero v City of Pomona, 665 F Supp 853 (C
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ever, the assumption often had little consequence. Courts that
permitted plaintiffs to combine into coalitions of sufficient size to
satisfy the first Gingles prong typically dismissed the suits." They
did so on the ground that the plaintiff class, while sufficiently
large, was now insufficiently cohesive to meet the second Gingles
prong." For example, in Growe v Emison," the Supreme Court
assumed that members of various minority groups in Minneapolis
could form a coalition to challenge congressional and state legislative districts." It then dismissed the challenge, however, because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate sufficient cohesion, proof
47
that the Court deemed "all the more essential" in coalition cases.
Despite the difficulties faced by the early plaintiffs, these initial
cases established the precedent for permitting aggregation. As
the racial and ethnic diversity of jurisdictions throughout the
United States continues to grow, the issue of whether courts
should adhere to these precedents will become increasingly significant.
B.

Explicit Approval of Minority Coalitions in the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits and Tacit Approval in the Second Circuit

The Fifth Circuit is the only federal circuit court to explicitly
approve aggregation of minority groups, rather than assume its
validity, and to find that the resulting plaintiff class was suffiD Cal 1987), affd, 883 F2d 1418 (9th Cir 1989) (same). Besides the federal courts, at least
two state Supreme Courts made a similar assumption. See Wilson v Eu, 823 P2d 545,
549-50 (Cal 1992) (approving a special masters' redistricting plan that created majorityminority districts for blacks and Hispanics); Mellow v Mitchell, 607 A2d 204, 219 (Pa
1992) (assuming that blacks and Hispanics could aggregate if sufficiently cohesive, but
rejecting aggregation because no evidence of such cohesion existed). And finally, one California district court held that a minority coalition was acceptable, but dismissed because
even the coalition was insufficiently large to satisfy the first Gingles prong. Skorepa v City
of Chula Vista, 723 F Supp 1384, 1390 (S D Cal 1989). This precedent cannot really be
attributed to the Ninth Circuit, as can the Second Circuit's tacit approval, see text accompanying notes 55-58, because Skorepa was never considered on appeal by the Ninth Circuit.
43 Growe, 507 US at 41-42; Badillo, 956 F2d at 891; Romero, 665 F Supp at
864-66.
Though this Comment speaks in terms of the "early cases," the fact is that the trend developed in Growe, Badillo,Romero, etc., continues still. See Frank v Forest County, 194 F
Supp 2d 867, 879 (E D Wis 2002) (noting the circuit split, but refusing to decide the question because the case was decided on other grounds).
44 Growe, 507 US at 41-42; Badillo, 956 F2d at 891; Romero, 665 F Supp at
864-66;
Frank, 194 F Supp 2d at 868. See also Skorepa, 723 F Supp at 1390 (dismissing because
minority coalition failed to satisfy the first, rather than the second, Gingles precondition).
45 507 US 25 (1993).
46 Id at
47 Id.

41.
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ciently cohesive to meet the second prong of the Gingles test. It
did so in two separate cases: League of United Latin American
Citizens, Council No 4386 v Midland Independent School District" ("LULAC ") in 1987, and Campos v City of Baytown"' in
1988. The LULAC I court found that forming a coalition would be
"mutually beneficial" to both blacks and Hispanics. ° It premised
this holding on the fact that the groups not only shared a history
of victimization from discriminatory practices, but also "inseparable" political goals." The Campos court similarly found that
both Hispanics and blacks had traditionally faced discrimination,
and thus "[i]f, together, they are of such numbers residing geographically so as to constitute a majority in a single member district, they cross the Gingles threshold as potentially disadvantaged voters." 2
Following the Fifth Circuit's lead and without further analysis, the Eleventh Circuit has also explicitly held, rather than
merely assumed, that aggregation will be allowed." Having done
so, however, it followed the pattern of most of the other cases and
dismissed the action for lack of cohesiveness."
Finally, in Bridgeport Coalition for Fair Representation v
City of Bridgeport," the Second Circuit became the only circuit
besides the Fifth to both permit aggregation and fail to dismiss
for lack of cohesiveness, but it did so implicitly." In Bridgeport,
the Second Circuit upheld the substantive terms of a district
court's preliminary injunction mandating that the City of Bridgeport create five minority-majority districts, including one
black/Hispanic majority district. Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the
Bridgeport court did not explicitly address the aggregation issue
812 F2d 1494, 1500-01 (5th Cir 1987), vacd en banc on state law grounds, 829 F2d
546 (5th Cir 1987).
49 840 F2d 1240, 1244 (5th Cir 1988).
812 F2d at 1500-01, quoting League of United Latin American Citizens, Council No
4386 v Midland Independent School District, 648 F Supp 596, 606 (W D Tex 1986) (lower
court decision).
51LULAC I, 812 F2d at 1500-01.
5' Campos, 840 F2d at 1244.
" See Concerned Citizens of Hardee County v Hardee County Board of Commissioners, 906 F2d 524, 526 (11th Cir 1990), citing Campos, 840 F2d at 1244, and LULAC I, 812
F2d at 1500-01.
Concerned Citizens of Hardee County, 906 F2d at 527.
55 26 F3d 271 (2d Cir 1994), vacd on other grounds and remd, 512 US 1283 (1994).
Id at 276 (noting that the proposed coalition presented substantial evidence on the
political cohesiveness of blacks and Hispanics in Bridgeport, while the City presented
little or no evidence on the question).
57 Id at 272-73.
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in its opinion. Nevertheless, the district court opinion that the
court upheld had expressly held that minority coalitions were
acceptable, citing to Campos and LULAC L"
C.

The Opponents of Aggregation

Though every court that considered minority coalitions in the
early cases ultimately permitted them, aggregation was not without its critics. The LULAC I decision drew a sharp dissent from
Judge Patrick Higginbotham, who argued that the decision to
sanction minority coalition plaintiffs moved Section 2 vote dilution cases beyond Congress's original intention, which was to protect victims of "chronic bigotry."9 Instead, he contended, the
LULAC I majority protected what amounted to nothing more
than simple political coalitions.' Judge Higginbotham elaborated
on his reasons for denying aggregation in his dissent from an order denying en banc rehearing of Campos ("Campos Rehearing
Dissent"). 1 Beyond the question of congressional intent, he articulated two policy reasons for opposing the aggregation approach.
First, he argued that even if Congress's intent was unclear
(which he did not believe), courts should not allow minority coalitions without explicit congressional authorization in light of the
tremendous impact that aggregation would have on all state and
local electoral systems.2 Second, he feared that permitting aggregation could actually limit the protections of the VRA, as defendants aggregate minorities to suit their needs as well.6,
Judge Higginbotham's reasoning soon gained other adherents on the Fifth Circuit. Several years after Campos, Judge
Edith Jones, joined by four other Fifth Circuit judges, echoed
these same themes while concurring in League of United Latin
American Citizens, Council No 4434 v Clements" ("LULAC IF').
The LULAC II plaintiffs challenged the county-based system for

5' Bridgeport Coalition for Fair Representation v City of Bridgeport, 1993 US Dist
LEXIS 19741, *20-21 (D Conn), affd by 26 F3d 271 (2d Cir 1994), vacd and remd on other
grounds by 512 US 1283 (1994).
'9 LULAC 1, 812 F2d at 1504 (Higginbotham dissenting).
60

Id.

6' Campos v City of Baytown, 849 F2d 943, 945-46 (5th Cir 1998) (Higginbotham

dissenting) (denying a request for rehearing en banc).
62 Id at 945.
Id at 945-46.
64 999 F2d 831, 894 n 2 (5th Cir 1993) (Jones concurring)
(endorsing Higginbotham's
dissents in LULAC I and Campos).
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electing state judges in Texas." The court individually analyzed
the claims of vote dilution for each county.66 Consistent with Fifth
Circuit precedent, the court permitted minority coalitions of
blacks and Hispanics to act as plaintiffs in some counties; in others the groups proceeded alone.6 ' The LULAC II court rejected all
of the challenges in turn.' Judge Jones concurred in the dismissals, but wrote separately to opine that the illegitimacy of minority
coalitions constituted an alternative ground for the results.6'
LULAC II is unique in that the plaintiffs were not alone in
using aggregation to further their litigation aims. In two counties, Harris and Tarrant, only black voters opposed the system of
judicial elections.0 The district court found that blacks' votes
were being diluted in those counties, a finding that the defendants challenged on the ground that the district court had failed
to consider a contest in which the black-preferred candidate was
Hispanic, as well as evidence that blacks and Hispanics were politically cohesive.' The Fifth Circuit never reached the issue with
respect to Harris County because the court determined that,
whether or not the additional elections were included, the finding
of vote dilution was clearly erroneous and the defendant deserved
to prevail. 2 But, with respect to Tarrant County, the Fifth Circuit
determined that it was erroneous not to have aggregated blacks
and Hispanics for purposes of analyzing vote dilution. "
Finally, in Nixon, a majority of the Sixth Circuit adopted
Judge Higginbotham's reasoning in his Campos Rehearing Dissent." It became the first federal circuit court to prohibit minority
coalitions, thereby creating the current circuit split."
Id at 837 (majority).
Id at 877-93.
67

Id.

LULAC 11, 999 F2d at 877-93.
Id at 894 (Jones concurring). That the court permitted minority coalitions is particularly ironic since Judge Higginbotham wrote for the majority in LULAC I.
70 Id at 880, 885
(majority).
68

71 Id
72
71

at 881.

LULAC II, 999 F2d at 881 n 37.

Id at 886.

71 Nixon, 76 F3d at 1388 ("We, however, share the concerns articulated by
Judge

Higginbotham in his dissent from the denial of rehearing in Campos.").
76 Id (acknowledging the split and explaining that "[alithough we do not take lightly
disagreement with the views of our sister circuits, we are not constrained to follow them if,
in our opinion, they are based upon an incomplete or incorrect analysis. ... Given the
settled principles of statutory interpretation, which none of the aforementioned courts
acknowledged, let alone applied, and § 2's clear text, we decline plaintiffs' invitation to
follow [the authority supporting aggregation].").
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II. THE FEDERALISM CANON OF GREGORY VASHCROFT

Most of the academic commentary on minority coalitions has
centered around the question of Congress's intent in passing the
VRA amendments in 1982.6 This inquiry has taken two closelyrelated approaches: determining whether there is textual support
for aggregation, and discussing extra-textual evidence of congressional intent that suggests that Congress intended to permit or
prohibit aggregation. This is well-traveled terrain, and revisiting
it in any detail would prove unprofitable." When text and purpose
are ambiguous, however, courts often turn to canons of construction to resolve ambiguities. 6 This section analyzes the "plain
statement" federalism rule announced in Gregory and argues that
it should lead courts to forbid minority coalitions.
A.

Gregory v Ashcroft, Federalism, and a Plain Statement Rule

Judge Higginbotham first raised the idea of demanding a
clear statement from Congress in the Campos Rehearing Dissent,
stating, "Playing with the structure of local government in an
effort to channel political factions is a heady game; we should insist that Congress speak plainly when it would do so."' When
Judge Higginbotham first invoked this clear statement standard
for interference with state political systems, it was not supported
with any citation to precedent. Two years later, however, the Supreme Court handed down Gregory. The Gregory Court adopted
the principle that proper respect for state prerogatives demands
that whenever Congress seeks to use its constitutional authority
to impair fundamental attributes of state sovereignty, it must do
so explicitly.o That is, courts should not infer such abrogations in
reviewing statutes that potentially tread on core state functions. 1
76

See text accompanying note 9.
text accompanying note 9.
point of this section is not to enter the debate over the legitimacy of canons of

77 See
76 The

construction that has raged in the academic literature over the past few decades. See
Russell Holder, Comment, Say What You Mean and Mean What You Say: The Resurrection of Plain Meaning in California Courts, 30 UC Davis L Rev 569, 587 n 113 (1997)
(noting that the "canons have been the subject of much controversy in this century").
Rather, this Comment takes it as a given that, as an empirical matter, canons are typically regarded as a traditional tool of statutory interpretation. See note 21.
79 Campos Rehearing Dissent, 849 F2d at
945.
80 501 US at 461 ("This plain statement rule is nothing
more than an acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme,
powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.").
81

Id.

3631

MINORITY COALITION PLAINTIFFS AND THE VRA

375

Though it is unclear whether, as a legal matter, the Gregory
canon applies to the VRA,82 the Gregory Court's justifications for
that rule' are instructive for determining as a matter of policy
whether courts should sanction minority coalitions.
At issue in Gregory was the application of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") to Missouri's state judges."
In 1967, Congress passed the ADEA to protect citizens over the
age of forty from, among other things, dismissal on the basis of
their age.' The Act contained a specific exception, however, for
"appointee[s] on the policymaking level." Missouri's state constitution required state judges to retire at the age of seventy. 7 The
question for the Gregory Court was whether Missouri's judges,
who were initially appointed but then subject to retention elections, were policymaking appointees. 8"
Finding the language of the ADEA too ambiguous to adequately resolve the question, the Court employed a plain statement rule to find that the ADEA did not apply to Missouri's state
judges.' The Court explained that, "[they would] not read the
ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress has made it clear
that judges are included." They justified this rule by citing respect for traditional state prerogatives. The federalist structure,
the Court contended, preserves the responsiveness of local government, allows states to function as social laboratories competing for citizens, and protects fundamental liberties by acting as a
counterweight to the power of the federal government.9'

See subsection II B.
501 US at 460-61, quoting Will v Michigan Departmentof State Police, 491 US 58,
65 (1989), which stated:
82

[Ihf Congress intends to alter the "usual constitutional balance between
the States and the Federal Government," it must make its intention to do
so "unmistakably clear in the language of the statute." ... Congress
should make its intention "clear and manifest" if it intends to pre-empt
the historic powers of the States. . . . "In traditionally sensitive areas,
such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear
statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to
bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision."
29 USC §§ 621-634 (1994).
29 USC §§ 621, 631(a).
8M 29 USC § 630(f).
87 See Mo Const Art V,
§ 26 (2000).
88 501 US at 467.
Id at 470.
90 Id at 467.
91 Id at 458. As Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, said:
84
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The Court deemed establishing the qualifications of elected
officials to be of particular importance to the integrity of internal
state governance. As Justice O'Connor wrote, "Congressional
interference with this decision of the people of Missouri, defining
their constitutional officers, would upset the usual constitutional
balance of federal and state powers. For this reason, 'it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Congress' intent before finding that federal law overrides' this balance." 3 When applied to the controversy over aggregation, the principle expressed
by this sweeping language would appear to caution against expanding the provisions of Section 2 more broadly than Congress
clearly anticipated, for the legislative reapportionment and the
design of voting systems is unquestionably a traditional state
function."
It is important to be clear exactly what is at stake here: if
courts apply the Gregory canon to prevent aggregation attempts
by VRA plaintiffs, they would not necessarily negate the general
validity of applying the VRA to the states, even though the VRA
arguably interferes with core state functions. The VRA, by definition, is a clearly stated congressional intrusion into the tradi-

This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be
more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for
more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry ... Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is
a check on abuses of government power. "The 'constitutionally mandated
balance of power' between the States and the Federal Government was
adopted by the Framers to ensure the protection of 'our fundamental liberties.'"
Id, quotingAtascaderoState Hospital v Scanlon, 473 US 234, 242 (1985).
92 Gregory, 501 US at 460 ('This provision goes beyond an area traditionally regulated
by the States; it is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity. Through
the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sovereign.").
93 Id (citation omitted).
94 See, for example, Growe, 507 US at 34 ("[Tihe Constitution leaves with the States
primary responsibility for apportionment of their federal congressional and state legislative districts. 'We say once again what has been said on many occasions: reapportionment
is primarily the duty and responsibility of the State through its legislature or other body,
rather than of a federal court.' Absent evidence that these state branches will fail timely
to perform that duty, a federal court must neither affirmatively obstruct state reapportionment nor permit federal litigation to be used to impede it.") (citations omitted), quoting Chapman vMeier, 420 US 1, 27 (1975).
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tional state domain of election administration, 5 and it is wellsettled that the VRA is within Congress's power to enact.96 The

question here, however, concerns the incremental reach of the
statute. Just because Congress clearly intended to interfere with
state election systems by passing and amending the VRA, it does
not inevitably follow that courts should infer an intention to interfere to such a degree as to encompass minority coalitions.
There was no question in Gregory that the ADEA applied to at
least some state officials, thereby abrogating traditional state
prerogatives." The question before the Gregory Court was how far
that abrogation extended. 98
B.

Ambiguity over Whether the Gregory Canon Applies to the
VRA: Chisom v Roemer

As noted, however, a question exists about the application of
the Gregory canon to the VRA, or indeed to any legislation passed
pursuant to Congress's constitutional authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments" as opposed to Congress's Article I powers. The lower courts have, not surprisingly, disagreed
on the applicability of the Gregory canon to the VRA."' This ambiguity may explain why the Gregory canon was not invoked by
either Judge Jones in her LULAC II concurrence' or by the
95 See Chisom, 501 US at 412 (Scalia dissenting) (noting that "here the question is
whether judges were excluded from a general imposition upon state elections that unquestionably exists [as a result of the VRA]) (emphasis added).
See South Carolinav Katzenbach, 383 US 301, 308 (1966) (upholding the constitutionality of the.VRA).
9' See 501 US at 456 (noting that under 29 USC § 630(b)(2) "[t]he term 'employer'
[was] defined to include 'a State or political subdivision of a State.'").
9 See text accompanying notes 84 to 88.
" Unlike the ADEA (the statute at issue in Gregory), which was arguably passed
pursuant to Congress's power under the Fourteenth Amendment, 501 US at 467, the VRA
was passed pursuant to Congress's authority under the Fifteenth Amendment. See generally South Carolinav Katzenbach, 383 US 301 (1966). For purposes of this analysis, however, that distinction is generally regarded as irrelevant. See City of Rome v United States,
446 US 156, 208 n 1 (1980) (Rehnquist dissenting) ("[Tihe nature of the enforcement powers conferred by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments has always been treated as
coextensive ...For this reason, it is not necessary to differentiate between the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment powers for the purposes of this opinion.") (citations omitted).
100 Compare Nipper v Smith, 39 F3d 1494, 1532 n 75 (11th Cir 1994) (suggesting that
Gregory applies to the VRA), with Farrakhanv Locke, 987 F Supp 1304, 1308-09 (E D
Wash 1997) (rejecting applicability).
101 This failure is perhaps particularly ironic, because the LULAC II majority opinion
(written by Judge Higginbotham) mentions the Gregory clear statement rule seemingly
with approval, though the citation was unrelated to aggregation and the clear statement
rule was not ultimately the basis on which the court applied Gregory to LULAC II. See
999 F2d at 872.
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Nixon majority. How future courts resolve this ambiguity ultimately depends on how much weight they give to the Supreme
Court's silence in Chisom, decided the same day as Gregory,
about whether the Gregory canon applies to the VRA.
In Chisom, the Supreme Court faced the question of whether
Louisiana state supreme court justices were "representatives,"
such that the VRA's amended Section 2 covered elections for that
position.'2 The Gregory canon suggested that the Court would
read an ambiguous use of language in favor of traditional state
prerogatives, such as choosing constitutional officers.' In spite of
this, the Court read the word "representatives" broadly to include
judges and all other "winners of representative, popular elections.".4 In the process the Court did not deign to distinguish the
federalism canon that it handed down that day in Gregory, choosing to ignore it. Instead, the Chisom Court invoked an alternative canon of statutory construction: as remedial legislation, it
reasoned, the VRA should be liberally construed to achieve its
purpose of combating racial discrimination."'0 Several years later,
the Nixon dissent invoked this "remedial legislation" canon as
well. ' '7
Though the Chisom majority ignored the seeming disparity
between that case and Gregory, Justice Scalia noted the inconsistency in his dissent to Chisom.'0 While Justice Scalia did not see
any linguistic ambiguity to be resolved by Gregory's default
rule,'O and was thus "content to dispense with the 'plain statement' rule [of Gregory] in the present case,""0° he thought it indicative of the Chisom Court's flawed approach that it did not
even consider the Gregory canon."' Nevertheless, Justice Scalia
suggested that Gregory might plausibly be distinguished on three
102
103

501 US at 386-87.
See id at 411 (Scalia dissenting) (noting that the Gregory canon would support a

holding'in favor of the defendant state).
'0' Id at 399 (majority).
'05 The Chisom Court did cite Gregory once, but only for the proposition that judges
are policymakers. See id at 399 n 27.
'0' Chisom, 501 US at 403 ("[Tlhe [VRA] should be interpreted in a manner that provides 'the broadest possible scope' in combating racial discrimination.").
'o' Nixon, 76 F3d at 1398 (Keith dissenting), quoting Chisom v Edwards, 839 F2d
1056, 1059 (5th Cir 1988).
1o8 Chisom, 501 US at 411-12 (Scalia dissenting).
'09 Id at 410 (Scalia dissenting) ("There is little doubt that the ordinary meaning of
'representatives' does not include judges.").
Id at 412.
"'
Id ("[lit says something about the Court's approach to this decision that the possibility of applying that rule never crossed its mind.").
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grounds. First, in Gregory, reading the statute to include judges
would have made them the only exception to a general exemption
for high level officials, whereas an alternative reading in Chisom
would have made judges the only exception from a general statutory imposition."' Second, in Gregory, it was debatable whether
Congress was invoking its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment (rather than the Commerce Clause), whereas in Chisom it
was obvious that Congress was acting pursuant to the Civil War
amendments."3 The Gregory Court recognized, after all, that federalism arguments have less logical force against Fourteenth
Amendment legislation because the Civil War amendments were
specifically designed to intrude on state prerogatives in a way
that the Commerce Clause was not."' Finally, Justice Scalia
noted that the Court had implicitly rejected a plain statement
rule as applied to Section 2 in City of Rome v United States. '
Whether these arguments ultimately have legal force against applying the Gregory canon to aggregation remains to be seen, but
as the next section will demonstrate, they would appear to be
weak threads upon which to hang the distinction between Chisom
and Gregory.
C.

Evaluating the Reasons for Rejecting Gregory's Application
to the VRA

Upon closer examination, the reasons proposed by the Chisom majority and Justice Scalia for distinguishing Chisom and
Gregory are unconvincing. First, the remedial nature of the VRA
does little to distinguish Gregory and Chisom, and invoking of the
remedial legislation canon does nothing to resolve the tension
between the two cases. The ADEA, after all, was remedial legislation as well."6 That fact did not spare it from the operation of the
Gregory canon.
"' Chisom, 501 US at 411-12 ("[I]nterpreting the statute to include judges would have
made them the only high-level state officials affected, whereas here the question is
whether judges were excluded from a general imposition upon state elections that unquestionably exists.").
113

Id.

Gregory, 501 US at 468, quoting City of Rome v United States, 446 US 156, 179
(1980) ("ITIhe principles of federalism that constrain Congress' exercise of its Commerce
Clause powers are attenuated when Congress acts pursuant to its powers to enforce the
Civil War Amendments. This is because those 'Amendments were specifically designed as
an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty.") (citation omitted).
116446 US 156, 178-80 (1982) cited by Gregory, 501 US at 412 (Scalia dissenting).
116 See McKennon v Nashville Banner Publishing Co, 513 US 352, 358 (1995) ("Congress designed the remedial measures in [the ADEA and Title VII, upon which the ADEA
114
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Next, it is unclear what force Justice Scalia's first distinction
has in the context of the debate over aggregation. Certainly Section 2 contains a blanket prohibition-a general imposition upon
state elections-against degrading the right to vote."7 On the
other hand, the blanket prohibition applies only to certain, select
plaintiffs or classes of citizens."8 As in Gregory, permitting aggregation would read a statute to include the greater by detailing
the lesser. Unlike Chisom, courts are not carving out an exception from an otherwise recognized class of covered individuals. It
is the very coverage as an initial matter that is in question, as in
Gregory. Thus, the distinction proposed by Justice Scalia, whatever its force in the context of Chisom, is inapposite in the case of
minority coalitions.
Furthermore, the language of Gregory itself appears to dispense with Justice Scalia's distinction between the Commerce
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. After all, the Gregory
Court specifically declared that, "[iln the face of such ambiguity,
we will not attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state
governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted
pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers or § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.". It further stated that, in declaring the "'appropriate test for determining when Congress intends to enforce' the
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, [the Court] adopted a
rule fully cognizant of the traditional power of the States. "'20This
rule was that "[because such legislation imposes congressional
policy on a State involuntarily, and because it often intrudes on
traditional state authority, [the Court] should not quickly attribute to Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."'2 '
A further reason to think that Gregory applies in Fourteenth
Amendment cases is the fact that Gregory explicitly rested upon
the "clear statement" rule of PennhurstState School & Hospital v
Halderman,' which addressed the Fourteenth Amendment,
was modeled] to serve as a 'spur or catalyst' to cause employers 'to self-examine and to
self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible,
the last vestiges' of discrimination.").
"' See text accompanying notes 28 and 29.
11 42 USC § 1973 (setting out the application to racial minorities); 42 USC
§ 1973b(fX2) (setting out the application to language minorities).
19
1
121
122

501 US at 470 (emphasis added).
Id at 469 (citation omitted).

Id, quoting Pennhurst State School & Hospital v Halderman,451 US 1, 16 (1981).
451 US 1 (1981).
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rather than the Commerce Clause.'2 Most telling of all on this
point, perhaps, is the fact that Justice Stevens, the author of the
Chisom opinion, joined Justice White's concurrence in Gregory.
There, White acknowledged that "[the] plain statement rule will
apply with full force24to legislation enacted to enforce the Four-

teenth Amendment."

Finally, Justice Scalia himself pointed out that, while City of
Rome tacitly rejected applying the plain statement rule to Section
2, that decision considered the unamended Section 2 of 1965.'2
Prior to the 1982 amendments, courts treated Section 2 as no
more than a restatement of the Fifteenth Amendment. 126 They

regarded coverage of the statutory and constitutional provisions
as "coextensive. 2 In that context, there would be no need for a
plain statement rule, because Congress had not encroached upon
the sovereignty of states to any greater extent than the Fifteenth
Amendment itself. When Congress added the results test of Section 2 in 1982,'2 however, it increased the statutory coverage beyond that of the Fifteenth Amendment; while the amended Section 2 disregards intent, discriminatory intent is the touchstone
of the Fifteenth Amendment.' 9 It is Congress's move beyond the
constitutional requirements that demands a plain statement rule
like that announced in Gregory. Furthermore, as Justice Scalia
noted, City of Rome was decided before the
plain statement rule
1
of Gregory had achieved its current force. 3'

In Nixon, the case prohibiting aggregation, the majority ultimately distinguished Chisom. It reasoned that, although it was
undisputed in Chisom that Section 2 covered judicial elections
prior to 1982, it was equally undisputed in the context of aggregation that the terms of Section 2 did not permit minority coalitions under any previous iteration of the VRA. 1 Thus, while the
Chisom court thought it would have been "anomalous" for Congress to remove judicial elections from Section 2's coverage without comment, it would be equally anomalous for Congress to au12 Id at 16.
124Gregory, 501 US at 479 (White, with Stevens joining,
1'2Chisorn, 501 US at 412 (Scalia dissenting).
126See

concurring).

id at 392 (majority), citing City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55, 60-61 (1980).
Chisom, 501 US at 392.
128 See Gingles, 478 US at 43-44 (citing a report of the Senate Judiciary Committee for
the proposition that Congress meant results, not intent, to be the basis of an action under
section 2 of the VRA).
127

129 Bolden, 446 US at 74.
130
131

Chisom, 501 US at 412 (Scalia dissenting).
Nixon, 76 F3d at 1389.
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thorize minority coalitions without comment.' Though it remains
to be seen how the Supreme Court will ultimately resolve the
tension between Chisom and Gregory, the distinctions proposed
to date are unpersuasive.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF COURTS PERMITTING AGGREGATION
MILITATE AGAINST SUCH A RULE

In addition to canons of construction, courts are also inclined
to resolve statutory ambiguity by considering the policy consequences of alternative interpretations."3 The purpose of this Part
is to examine and evaluate the policy justifications advanced by
each side of the debate over minority coalitions. First, this Part
examines the policy rationales articulated by Judge
Higginbotham in the Campos Rehearing Dissent (and adopted by
the Nixon court) for forbidding aggregation: (1) reluctance to unduly interfere with state election systems, and (2) a fear that bad
faith actors might use aggregation defensively." After analyzing
these rationales, this section briefly raises a concern wholly ignored by courts and academics alike: the probability that defensive aggregation once accepted for Section 2 claims will be expanded to VRA Section 5 cases as well, thereby posing risks to
minority voters that parallel those presented by defensive aggregation in Section 2 cases. It finally considers the strength of the
policy justifications put forth by aggregation's proponents.
A.

Hesitation to Unduly Burden Parties to Litigation

While Judge Higginbotham's language about the "heady
game" of "playing with the structure of local government to channel political factions'' 6 supports the federalism canon of Gregory,
it could just as easily be justified as a concern about placing excessive burdens on litigants."' Apart from any argument for protecting state prerogatives against federal tyranny, permitting
aggregation could have a detrimental impact of a more prosaic
nature on states and municipalities seeking to comply in good
faith with Section 2, effects that can be measured in dollars and
1"2

Id.

'n See note 22.
13 Nixon, 76 F3d at 1391, quoting Campos Rehearing Dissent, 849 F2d at 945-46
(Higginbotham dissenting).
35 See text accompanying note 79.
136 Judge Higginbotham did not elaborate on the conceptual foundations that underlie
this concern.
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cents. " ' Voting rights litigation, particularly at the municipal
level, is an onerous undertaking. It is "complex and difficult,"13
resulting in a process that is "expensive and labor intensive."'

VRA challenges can put "enormous burdens on the budgets and
energies of city or special district staffs and elected politicians
alike; they constitute[,] in effect, major crises in the political life
of the jurisdictions; and, in some cases, litigation threaten[s] lit4
erally to bankrupt the city or special district."'
Courts are not typically sympathetic to defendants who plead
financial burdens as a reason to read the law in a manner that

avoids litigation altogether.' The operative principle seems to be
"if you can't do the time, don't do the crime." But Section 2 does
not require a "crime"; that section essentially imposes strict liability on states and municipalities, significantly increasing the risk
that these burdens will fall upon jurisdictions that have made
every effort to comply in good faith with the requirements of the
VRA."' These burdens should give courts pause about permitting
137 The litigation bill can run to hundreds of thousands of dollars even for a small
jurisdiction of a few thousand people, bringing the jurisdiction to the verge of bankruptcy
if it is forced to defend a VRA suit. See Adams, Latinos and Local Representation at 137
(cited in note 4) (noting that the Alta Vista Hospital District in Dinuba, California, tallied
legal bills of $200,000 for a district of only 13,000 people). See also id at 73 (noting that in
the City of Dinuba, California, the costs of VRA litigation added up to nearly $60 per person, more than the annual cost of Dinuba's Fire Department).
18 See Jenkins v Red Clay Consolidated School Board District Board of Education, 4
F3d 1103, 1136 (3d Cir 1993) (noting that "Voting Rights challenges, by their nature, are
often complex and difficult").
'39
Adams, Latinos and Local Representation at xv (cited in note 4) (noting that voting
rights litigation is very "expensive and labor intensive").
140

Id.

See, for example, Gerber v Hickman, 264 F3d 882, 891-92 (9th Cir 2001), vacd and
rehearing en banc granted, 273 F3d 843 (rejecting the California Department of Corrections' argument that fear of expensive equal protection litigation brought by female prisoners was a sufficient "penological interest" to justify restricting artificial insemination to
male prisoners); Ting v AT&T, 182 F Supp 2d 902, 907 (N D Cal 2002) (holding that a
contract clause prohibiting class actions against AT&T could not be justified by AT&T's
interest in reducing litigation costs).
...By "strict liability" I simply mean that there is no requirement that any culpable
intent be proven-merely that plaintiffs suffered a specified harm. See, for example,
Vernon Palmer, A General Theory of the Inner Structure of Strict Liability: Common Law,
Civil Law, and Comparative Law, 62 Tul L Rev 1303 (1988), which includes the following
definition of strict liability:
141

[S]trict liability rests upon an inelastic concept of unlawful harm. When
the legal order creates a strict liability measure, it creates a guarantee of
safety or an obligation of result, favoring the security of a particularclass
of individuals. This obligation guarantees against certain losses or injuries resulting from a lawful, but perilous, activity. Thus unlawfulness
characterizes only the harm and not the activity producing it. Only the
materialization of the injury is unlawful or wrongful. . . . The injurer is
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minority coalitions as long as questions remain about Congress's
intention to sanction them. Such reticence is not without precedent. Indeed, in construing § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, " the Supreme Court has held that Congress should be

expected to impose strict liability "expressly or by unmistakable
inference." 14' The Court continued, "It is inappropriate to reach
the harsh result of imposing § 16(b)'s liability without fault on
the basis of unclear language."'
Concededly, minority coalitions are not the primary cause of
substantial harm to good faith actors; they merely magnify a risk
inherent in Section 2 litigation. The risk arises in the first instance from the fact that, under Section 2, plaintiffs need not
demonstrate that the defendant jurisdiction acted with any discriminatory intent.' To prevail, plaintiffs need only show that
the challenged electoral system has the result of diluting minority
voting strength.' Congress made a policy judgment, deciding
that requiring plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent would create profound evidentiary difficulties that would erect unacceptably high barriers to most suits, even meritorious ones." Specifiliable almost automatically if he has caused the defined event (e.g.,
death) or the defined type of damage-regardlessof whether he acted intentionally, unintentionally,or with the utmost care.
Id at 1309 (emphasis added).
1
15 USC § 78p(b) (2000).
I" Foremost-McKesson,Inc v ProvidentSecurities Co, 423 US 232, 252 (1976).
145 Id. See also Gollust v Mendell, 501 US 115, 122
(1991) ("Because the statute imposes 'liability without fault within its narrowly drawn limits,' we have been reluctant to
exceed a literal, 'mechanical' application of the statutory text in determining who may be
subject to liability, even though in some cases a broader view of statutory liability could
work to eliminate an 'evil that Congress sought to correct through § 16(b)."') (internal
citations omitted).
146 See Voting Rights Act Extension, S Rep No
417, 97th Cong, 2d Sess 15-16 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 USCCAN 177, 192-93 ("Senate Report") ("The proposed amendment to
section 2 of the voting rights act is designed to restore the legal standard that governed
voting discrimination cases prior to the Supreme Court's decision in [City of Mobile v
Bolden, 446 US 55 (1980)]. In pre-Bolden cases plaintiffs could prevail by showing that a
challenged election law or procedure, in the context of the total circumstances of the local
electoral process, had the result of denying a racial or language minority an equal chance
to participate in the electoral process. Under this results test, it was not necessary to
demonstrate that the challenged election law or procedure was designed or maintained for
a discriminatory purpose.").
147

See text accompanying note 128.

See Senate Report, 1982 USCCAN at 194 (cited in note 146) ("The intent test focuses on the wrong question and places an unacceptable burden upon plaintiffs in voting
discrimination cases."). The purpose of this Comment is not to question the wisdom of this
difficult policy choice. It is worth noting, however, that Section 2's constitutionality as
amended has never been explicitly decided. Justice Kennedy has suggested on several
occasions that he does not believe the question to be adequately resolved. See Chisom, 501
146
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cally, they feared that an intent requirement presented grave
risks that bad faith actors could infringe minorities' voting rights
with impunity, so long as they were not foolish enough to commit
to paper the fact that they were doing so. ' On the other hand,
plaintiffs would not need any evidence of intent at all to prove
that a result was discriminatory. Instead, plaintiffs could prove
such results by objective evidence. Thus, the legislative history of
the VRA includes a number of concrete factors that indicate discriminatory results."u To protect minority voting rights, Congress
made a conscious choice to separate liability from culpability,
willingly taking the chance that some innocent jurisdictions
would bear the brunt of unjustified liability under the VRA.
However, this policy decision does not force courts to exacerbate the risk to innocent jurisdictions by allowing aggregation,
which provides states and municipalities no reliable means of
structuring their voting systems to avoid either lawsuits or liability. Permitting aggregation would multiply the number of protected groups to levels so unwieldy that they would be practically
impossible for legislators and administrators to adequately address. Those legislators and administrators would have to assess
each voting system or districting plan for its impact on each of
the groups currently protected, and then for every possible combination of those groups. 1 Congress has made no clear statement
that they favor such a morass. Moreover, simple notions of fairness dictate that there should be some form of safe harbor that
allows jurisdictions to demonstrate compliance with Section 2
US at 418 (Kennedy dissenting) ("I write to add only that the issue before the Court is one
of statutory construction, not constitutional validity. Nothing in today's decision addresses
the question whether § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as interpreted in [Gingles], is
consistent with the requirements of the United States Constitution."); Johnson v De
Grandy, 512 US 997, 1028-29 (1994) (Kennedy concurring) (expressing similar doubts).
149 Senate Report, 1982 USCCAN
at 215 (cited in note 146):
The inherent danger in exclusive reliance on proof of motivation lies not
only in the difficulties of plaintiff establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, but also in the fact that the defendants can attempt to rebut
that circumstantial evidence by planting a false trail of direct evidence in
the form of official resolutions, sponsorship statements and other legislative history eschewing any racial motive, and advancing other govern-

mental objectives.
150 See

note 233.

111See, for example, Katharine Inglis Butler, Redistricting in a Post-Shaw Era: A
Small Treatise Accompanied by Redistricting Guidelines for Legislators, Litigants, and
Courts, 36 U Rich L Rev 137, 263 (2002) (laying out guidelines to enable jurisdictions to
avoid VRA challenges, and listing a step that includes evaluation of the proposed plan's
impact on minority populations).
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without shouldering the burden of costly, elaborate litigation and
possible negative judgments. In a world without aggregation, the
safe harbor is fairly clear: there are a limited number of protected
racial and language minorities, and as a practical matter the jurisdiction usually need only assess the impact of a given voting
practice on each of those select groups.12
One can imagine a multiracial jurisdiction, perhaps in
Southern California, in which each of the major racial categories
from the 1990 census was represented (white, black, Native
American, Asian/Pacific Islander, and Other), as well as the Hispanic ethnic category.' In the absence of aggregation, such a jurisdiction could make a straightforward, good faith effort to comply with Section 2 by considering the impact of a proposed voting
system-perhaps a redistricting plan-on each of the five minority groups." Permitting minority coalitions potentially increases
the number of groups that the jurisdiction must consider to several times that number." That number may be further increased
by the Census Bureau's change in the 2000 Census to a multiracial census."' Depending on how multiracial individuals are categorized for purposes of voting rights litigation, the number of po152 The

idea that this would constitute a "safe harbor" is a practical, rather than legal,

characterization. The Supreme Court has specifically disavowed the notion that such
considerations, even if they result in perfectly proportional representation of all minorities, are a per se safe harbor to a Section 2 challenge. De Grandy, 512 US at 1018-21
(rejecting as dispositive Florida's defense that minorities were represented proportionally). As a practical matter, however, the Court did recognize that proportionality can be
relevant evidence that points against a violation. Id at 1020 ("[Plroportionality in the
sense used here is obviously an indication that minority voters [may] have an equal opportunity, in spite of racial polarization."). See also id at 1028-29 (Kennedy concurring)
(agreeing that proportionality is relevant, though not dispositive, evidence in vote dilution
cases and noting that "[olperating under the constraints of a statutory regime in which
proportionality has some relevance, States might consider it lawful and proper to act with
the explicit goal of creating a proportional number of majority-minority districts in an
effort to avoid [Section] 2 litigation").
'5' The 1990 Census was structured in such a way that one could choose both a racial
category and check the ethnicity box for "Hispanic origin." Thus, for each of these the
appropriate category is actually Non-Hispanic white, Non-Hispanic black, Non-Hispanic
Asian/Pacific-Islander, Non-Hispanic American Indian, or Non-Hispanic "Other." See
Deborah Davis, Multiracial CategoriesA Better Fit for Many, Santa Fe New Mexican A-1

(Mar 23, 2001).
"4 It need not, of course, consider the impact of the voting practice on the jurisdiction's
white population, as least so long as whites constitute a majority in the jurisdiction, since
the VRA presumably only protects minorities.
"" For example, where B=black, A=Asian, I=American Indian, O="Other", and
H=Hispanic, the jurisdiction would have to consider the following 23 combinations: B, BA,
BAI, BAIO, BAIOH, BI, BIO, BIOH, BO, BOH, BH, A, Al, AIO, AIOH, AO, AOH, AH, I,
10, IOH, III, and H.
15 Including, for example, such coalitions
as B-AI or H-BO, etc.
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tential plaintiff classes that public officials would need to consider could increase considerably."' Administratively, this increased effort could potentially overwhelm the resources of election administrators across the country.
Furthermore, as the number of possible plaintiff combinations increases, so does the possibility that the interests of two or
more of these groups will conflict, putting state and local officials
in the unenviable position of being sued no matter what system
they adopt. If they adjust the voting rules to avoid suit by a coalition group, they may well open themselves up to suit from each of
the individual constituent groups. Another possible scenario
might arise where there are three groups with varying political
cohesion among them, for example, blacks, Hispanics, and Native
Americans. A jurisdiction would then be put in a very difficult
position if Hispanics have enough in common with blacks and
American Indians to form a coalition with either, but blacks lack
sufficiently concurrent political interests with Indians to justify a
black-Indian class or a black-Hispanic-Indian class. As the Sixth
Circuit put it in Nixon, "For this court to give the states, under
the Voting Rights Act, a puzzle which is difficult to solve is one
thing. To give the states, under the guise of 'construction,' a puzzle which is impossible to solve is quite another."" The Nixon majority believed that such a puzzle was "precisely the result urged
by plaintiffs" in seeking a minority coalition."'

157

The Office of Management and Budget has already established a framework for

categorizing mixed race respondents for purposes of civil rights enforcement. See OMB
Bulletin No 00-02, available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/texttbOO02.html> (visited Feb 23, 2002) [on file with U Chi Legal F], cited by Executive Office of
the President, Provisional Guidance on the Implementation of the 1997 Standards for
Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 66 Fed Reg 3829 (2001). The Justice Department has
published similar guidelines for actions under VRA Section 5. Office of the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division; Guidance Concerning Redistricting and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 USC 1973c, 66 Fed Reg 5412 (2001). But
these guidelines do not bind courts-only executive agencies charged with enforcing civil
rights. See Nathan Persily, Color By Numbers: Race, Redistricting,and the 2000 Census,
85 Minn L Rev 899, 936 n 141 (2001) ("Note that the OMB guidelines apply only to agencies entrusted with the enforcement of civil rights laws, and thus courts are not bound by
them in a Section 2 case."). Furthermore, these guidelines have been widely criticized, and
"there remains the possibility that a court could strike down the OMB rules as either
unconstitutional or inconsistent with the Voting Rights Act." Id. See also id at 933 ("Critics of the OMB guidelines have described them as a modern version of the 'One Drop
Rule'-the Jim Crow-era law where one drop of black blood, or one iota of black ancestry,
made someone black.").
"'
Nixon, 76 F3d at 1391.
159Id.
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The Defensive Use of Aggregation by Bad Faith Actors

B.

Judge Higginbotham's second policy reason for opposing minority aggregation in the Campos Rehearing Dissent was a fear
that it could ultimately limit the protections of the VRA."4 Specifically, he was concerned that crooked jurisdictions would seize
upon aggregation, a tool initially approved to help minorities, to
defend themselves from challenges by a single minority group.6'
As Judge Higginbotham put it, "[W]ould this court accept the
consolidation theory if it had been made by a city defending
against a claim that minority interests of Black or language minorities had been submerged by the way in which the district
lines were drawn?""2 In other words, if blacks or Hispanics challenged a voting practice or system, would proponents of aggregation be willing to accept as a defense the claim that "minorities"
constituted majorities in enough districts that the individual
group has no cause to complain?
Proponents of minority coalitions have treated the question
of this "defensive aggregation" in cursory fashion when they have
treated it at all. Indeed, only two critics' 6 have addressed the
matter in any detail: the Sixth Circuit's Judge Damon Keith, who
summarily dismissed the concern in a dissent to Nixon;' " and one
commentator, Aylon M. Schulte." Neither considered defensive
aggregation to be a serious problem. As Schulte put it, "Although
at first glance this argument may be appealing, in practice it does
not seem to be a real concern."" Closer analysis suggests, however, that such a perfunctory dismissal is unjustified.
The primary argument advanced by both Judge Keith and
Schulte is that existing voting rights doctrine is adequate to ad-

160See
161

text accompanying note 63.
Campos Rehearing Dissent, 849 F2d at 945-46 (Higginbotham dissenting).

162

Id at 946.

'63 I have found one source other than Higginbotham's Campos dissent, Jones's
LULAC II concurrence, and the Nixon opinion that expressed concern with defensive
aggregation. See Ancheta and Imahara, 27 USF L Rev at 823 (cited in note 9). But
Ancheta and Imahara merely raise the idea of a coalition defense and point out some of
the difficult questions associated with it. Id at 823-24. They do not attempt any in-depth
analysis of the question.
14 76 F3d at 1402-03 (Keith dissenting).
"4 Aylon M. Schulte, Note, Minority Aggregation Under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights
Act: Toward Just Representationin Ethnically Diverse Communities, 1995 U Ill L Rev 441,
475-77 n 253.
1 Id. See also Nixon, 76 F3d at 1403 (Keith dissenting) (asserting that the cohesiveness prong of Gingles is sufficient to address this concern).
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dress attempts at defensive aggregation. 16 Implicitly referring to
the second Gingles prong, Keith argued that such attempts would
be impossible because the defendant seeking to aggregate must
demonstrate that the coalition is politically cohesive.'6 Schulte
gives an example of this proposition by pointing out that, in the
context of drawing single-member districts, a jurisdiction could
split two communities in such a way that half of each community
is in two different districts. 69 Instead of having a Hispanic district
and a Native American district, for example, there would be two
Hispanic-Native American districts, neither of which could elect a
minority-preferred candidate. 7 " But given that the minority voters constitute majorities in the two districts, the only possible
reason for a minority-preferred candidate to lose would be if the
Hispanic voters and the Native American voters do not vote together-if they lack the requisite political cohesion.'
The major weakness of this argument is that there is no
guarantee that courts will be able to distinguish between a temporary political coalition and a lasting minority coalition founded
on a shared history of discrimination. Judge Higginbotham voiced
this concern in the context of "offensive" aggregation, 7 2 but it has
equal force in the defensive aggregation context. One can easily
imagine a jurisdiction in which two minority groups vote together
through a few election cycles because they temporarily share concurrent political interests. When the political issues that bind
such groups lose force, however, the coalition may no longer vote
cohesively; indeed, the groups' interests may be sharply at odds.M

167 Nixon,

76 F3d at 1403 (Keith dissenting); Schulte, Note, 1995 U IlI
L Rev at 475 n

253 (cited in note 165) ("If the plaintiffs were not politically cohesive and did not share the
same interests in issues and candidates, then the defendant's mere claim that the plaintiffs are politically cohesive would not make it so.").
" Nixon, 76 F3d at 1403 (Keith dissenting) ("The very same standard that a coalition
of one or more groups must reach in order to demonstrate entitlement to Section 2 protection precludes attempts to submerge divergent interests. The coalition created must be in
all circumstances politically cohesive.").
169 Schulte, Note, 1995 U Ill
L Rev at 475 n 253 (cited in note 165).
170 Id.
'7

Id.

172See text accompanying note 60.
173

Some opponents of aggregation have cited social science literature demonstrating

that minority groups are often more hostile to each other than they are to the white majority. See, for example, LULAC 11, 999 F2d at 897-98 (Jones concurring), quoting Katherine
I. Butler and Richard Murray, Minority Vote Dilution Suits and the Problem of Two Minority Groups: Can a "Rainbow Coalition"Claim the Protection of the Voting Rights Act?,
21 Pac L J 619, 688-89 (1990) (explaining the "rarity of documented political alliances
between minority groups" in terms of different attitudes and perceptions amongst the
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Nevertheless, the defendant jurisdiction could use a string of
three or four elections with "cohesive voting" to establish a sufficient degree of political cohesion between the erstwhile allies.
This strategy would be particularly effective if the parties are
only required to meet a preponderance of the evidence standard,
which the Fifth Circuit adopted in Campos."'
Schulte raises another argument implicitly based on the first
Gingles prong in the context of challenges to at-large voting.' 7' He
points out that, to successfully defend against a vote dilution
claim, the challenged jurisdiction must show that minority voters
constitute over half the voting age population in the jurisdiction." 6
By its very tone, Schulte's argument suggests that such a scenario is too unlikely to merit serious consideration. Demographic
changes, however, have quickly overtaken this easy dismissal.
There are currently many jurisdictions in the United States
where whites constitute only a plurality of the population.'77 Indeed, the entire state of California now falls into this category.a
Leaving aside all the theoretical rejoinders to dismissals of
defensive aggregation, the most convincing argument for the notion that defensive aggregation could pose a serious risk is this:
aggregation has already been used defensively. It is not a mere
figment of a commentator's imagination, but a present reality. As
noted above, in LULAC II the Fifth Circuit held that the district
court committed reversible error when it refused to cede to Tarrant County's request that blacks and Hispanics be aggregated
for purposes of analyzing vote dilution.'
Schulte, despite initially dismissing the question, ultimately
appears to recognize the risks posed by defensive aggregation. He
then argues that it ought not to be permitted if it will harm minority interests." He noticeably fails, though, to posit any princigroups and the likelihood that different circumstances "are likely to lead to different,
possibly even conflicting, demands on the government").
174 849 F2d at 946 (Higginbotham dissenting) (criticizing the failure to at least adopt a
clear and convincing evidence standard to prove political cohesion in aggregation cases).
17 Schulte, Note, 1995 U Ill L Rev at 475 n 253 (cited in note 165).
176

Id.

See, for example, Census 2000; Focus: Changes in Ethnic Populations,LA Times U6
(Apr 1, 2001) (noting that whites were no longer the majority in several cities in Los Angeles County).
178 Maria L. LaGanga and Shawn Hubler, California Grows to 33.9 Million, Reflecting
Increased Diversity; Population:Data from the 2000 Census Show a Shift Inland. No Racial or Ethnic Group Is a Majority in the State, LA Times Al (Mar 30, 2001).
'79 See text accompanying
note 73.
"0 Schulte, Note, 1995 U III L Rev at 477 n 253 (cited in note 165).
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pled justification for preventing defendants from using aggregation when plaintiffs are allowed to do so, other than to simply
assert that "it is up to plaintiffs to shape their vote dilution
claims. ' 8' Surely this is generally true, as it is in most litigation.
But such control over litigation is never absolute. For example,
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provide for civil
defendants to compel joinder of additional plaintiffs if they would
be necessary or indispensable.'82 Moreover, in class action suits,
the interests of the plaintiffs in individually prosecuting a separate action is only one factor for courts to consider in determining
whether to certify a class action." Schulte does not explain why
courts should take the unusual step of giving VRA plaintiffs a
tool that they deny VRA defendants in the absence of specific
statutory language to that effect.
C.

Expanding the Logic of Defensive Aggregation to VRA
Section 5 Claims

A closely-related and reasonably foreseeable consequence of
permitting aggregation under Section 2 is the risk that jurisdictions will use defensive aggregation to water down the robust
protections of VRA Section 5. While it is beyond the scope of this
Comment to explore this subject in detail, it is worth a brief detour simply to point out the problems that such an expansion
could create.
By way of background, under VRA Section 5, certain designated jurisdictions must submit any proposed change of their
electoral system to either the Attorney General of the United
States or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia." The Attorney General or D.C. District Court must "preclear" the change before it can go into effect by certifying that the
change will not impermissibly work to the detriment of minority
voters.'8' The advantage of using Section 5 over Section 2 is that,
for certain jurisdictions with a history of discouraging minority

181

Id.
See FRCP 19.

FRCP 23(b)(3)(A). Other factors are "the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class," FRCP
23(b)(3)(B), "the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims
in the particular forum," FRCP 23(b)(3)(C), and "the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action," FRCP 23(b)(3)(D).
18 42 USC § 1973c.
1

185

Id.
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participation in the voting process,8 the presumption shifts from
"innocent until proven guilty" to "guilty until proven innocent."18
Since there is no need for an individual plaintiff to initiate a Section 5 action, discriminatory practices will not continue through
simple inertia.
The Supreme Court, however, has interpreted the requirements of Section 5 to prohibit only "retrogression."" In other
words, to gain preclearance and shift the presumption back to
"innocent until proven guilty," it is only necessary for a defendant
jurisdiction to show that minorities will not be made worse off
under the new system than they were under the old system, not
that they are as well off as they could possibly be.' 8 The Supreme
Court has also held that, even if the jurisdiction intends to make
minorities worse off by virtue of the changes, the Attorney General or D.C. District Court may not withhold preclearance if those
changes do not have that effect.'
The question then arises: may a jurisdiction obtain preclearance by arguing that a proposed change to its district lines are
not retrogressive because, for example, although the number of
black districts decreased, a corresponding increase in the number
of Hispanic districts makes up for it? In other words, could the
defendant jurisdiction show that they avoided retrogression of the
number of "minority" districts, merely by aggregating the minority populations, even if the position of black voters is significantly
weakened in the process? Is it just as good to have five Hispanic
districts and one black district as it is to have four Hispanic districts and two black districts?

1
To be fair, not all of the Section 5 jurisdictions are jurisdictions with substantial
histories of racial animus. See Adams, Latinos and Local Representation at 113-14 (cited
in note 4) (discussing the idiosyncratic circumstances that led to Kings County, California
becoming a "covered" jurisdiction). Nevertheless, the mechanics of Section 5 are set up in
such a way as to greatly increase the likelihood that jurisdictions caught in the Section 5
net will be the ones Congress deemed most problematic. See Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela
S. Karlan, and Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political
Process 556 (Foundation 2d ed 2001) (noting, "Although [Section 5] was stated in formal,
neutral terms, it managed to reach the Deep South and very few other jurisdictions").
181 See Bernard Grofman and Lisa Handley, 1990s Issues in Voting Rights, 65 Miss L J
205, 243 n 127 (1995) ("The section 5 preclearance provisions put the burden on covered
jurisdictions to demonstrate that changes do not have discriminatory effects or purpose.
...Thus, the usual 'innocent until proven guilty' standard was seemingly inverted.") (internal citation omitted).
'm Beer v United States, 425 US 130, 141 (1976).
189Id at 140-41.
'90
Reno v Bossier ParishSchool Bd, 528 US 320, 335 (2000).
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Just as it is difficult to find any principled reason to permit
plaintiff aggregation while forbidding defensive aggregation in
Section 2 cases, it is likewise difficult to find a compelling distinction between defensive aggregation under Section 5 and Section
2. As the Supreme Court has noted, "section 5 and section 2, virtually companion sections, operate in tandem to prohibit discriminatory practices in voting, whether those practices originate
in the past, present, or future."'9'
The possibility of minority aggregation in this context may
present an attractive option to certain jurisdictions faced with the
Catch-22 of shoring up black districts and inviting a Section 2
challenge or not doing so and being denied preclearance under
Section 5. In the 1990s round of redistricting, a number of state
and local jurisdictions, with the encouragement of. George Bush,
Sr.'s Justice Department, worked hard to maximize the number
of majority-minority districts to avoid VRA challenges." Those
efforts may well come back to haunt these jurisdictions in the
litigation related to the post-2000 Census round of redistricting,
which has already begun and will inevitably carry on through the
entire decade. Throughout the Southwest in particular, black
populations have held relatively steady, or grown only slightly,
being largely overwhelmed as a percentage of the population by a
dramatic influx of new Hispanic residents. 3 As a result, in some
jurisdictions blacks no longer have the population to justify controlling the same number of districts that they did during the
1990s."' Absent Herculean efforts on the part of those jurisdic"' Chisom, 501 US at 387, quoting Chisom v Edwards, 839 F2d 1056, 1064 (5th Cir
1988).
'9' See Susan B. Glasser, Early Rulings Indicate Justice Dept. to Push Hard to Create
Minority Districts in Remap, Roll Call 19 (Aug 1, 1991). Some critics of DOJ's policies
contended that the emphasis on majority-minority districts was not a result of heightened
solicitude for minority voting rights, but was rather a conscious political strategy to help
Republicans by "packing" minority, Democratic voters into safe Democratic districts. See,
for example, Black Majority DistrictsFace Challenge in Court, Chi Trib 10 (Mar 25, 1994)
("Republicans 'sold their souls,' ... and helped create the new majority-minority districts
because they hoped the surrounding districts would have fewer black voters and therefore
elect Republican candidates."); Hays v Louisiana, 839 F Supp 1188, 1197 n 21 (W D La
1993), vacd on other grounds at 512 US 1230 (1994) (criticizing the Bush, Sr. Justice Department for "arrogat[ing] the power to use Section 5 preclearance as a sword to implement forcibly its own redistricting policies, rather than as a shield to prevent lamentable
historical abuses.").
193 See generally Adams, Latinos & Local Representation(cited in note 4).
19 Though it is not a Section 5 jurisdiction, this pattern
can be seen quite starkly in
Los Angeles County congressional districts. In the wake of the 1991 redistricting, blacks
elected three representatives to Congress in South Central Los Angeles County: Julian
Dixon, Maxine Waters, and Juanita Millender-McDonald. Tony Quinn, The Dilemma of
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tions, the position of black voters in these areas will inevitably
retrogress. Furthermore, any efforts jurisdictions make could well
result in a vote dilution challenge under Section 2 by a jurisdiction's Hispanic voters if administrators try to use those Hispanic
voters to bolster black incumbents, rather than to create new
Hispanic districts."'
Despite the attractiveness to jurisdictions facing two unappealing choices, permitting aggregation to avoid the issue would
render the burden-shifting framework of Section 5 largely superfluous. The Supreme Court's holding in Reno v Bossier Parish"6
requires the Attorney General or D.C. District Court to preclear a
plan as long as the proposing jurisdiction avoids retrogressionregardless of the otherwise dilutive impact of the proposed electoral system. Thus, the proposing jurisdiction must merely show
that its new plan is no more dilutive than its predecessor.9 Simply put, if the new system is no worse than the one it replaces,
the system meets Section 5's requirements. Thus, the jurisdiction
need not show that the proposed minority group is politically cohesive, as is required under Gingles. Given this fact, it would be
easy for a jurisdiction to augment one minority at the expense of
another under Section 5 if aggregation were allowed. And since
discriminatory purpose is no bar to preclearance under Bossier
Parish,' the risk is that jurisdictions acting in bad faith will create a "favored minority" that is disproportionately wellrepresented, correspondingly weakening the position of other
Population Without Representation, LA Times M3 (May 20, 2001) ("The three black districts-the open Julian Dixon seat and those held by Reps. Maxine Waters and Juanita
Millender-McDonald-are a collective 107,000 short.... What's more, the people in these
districts are increasingly Latino."). An explosion of Hispanic population, however, has
overwhelmed the blacks to the point that blacks only now have sufficient population to
constitute majorities in only two LA districts. Richard E. Cohen, Redrawing the House,
Natl J 1022, 1055 (Apr 7, 2001) (noting the problems that this caused California Democrats).
195 This is likely to be a common trend in areas where
the black population has remained constant but the Hispanic population has experienced tremendous growth. See
Quinn, The Dilemma of PopulationWithout Representation,LA Times at M3 (cited in note
194) (discussing the history of diluting Hispanic voting power in Los Angeles County in
order to bolster the seats of white Democrat incumbents in previous decades, and the
likelihood that the same process would be followed in the 2001 redistricting to protect
black incumbents).
196 528 US 320
(2000).
197 Id at 335 ("[Preclearance] does not represent approval
of the voting change; it is
nothing more than a determination that the voting change is no more dilutive than what
it replaces, and therefore cannot be stopped in advance under the extraordinary burdenshifting procedures of § 5, but must be attacked through the normal means of a § 2 action.").
'98 See text accompanying note 190.
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less-favored minorities. In this scenario, aggrieved parties could
still bring a challenge under Section 2, but the presumption
would shift back in favor of the jurisdiction whose plan was precleared.
If courts permit aggregation in Section 2 challenges, then the
similarities between Section 2 and Section 5 suggest that courts
will permit aggregation in the latter context as well. The mechanics of Section 5 litigation already create a low threshold for covered jurisdictions to meet. They need not institute a new voting
device or system that makes minorities better off than they were
under the status quo; simply avoiding a worse system is enough.
If courts allow aggregation, they will further lower this alreadylow threshold, substantially rolling back the protections of Section 5.
D. Evaluating the Policy Justifications Supporting Aggregation
Proponents of minority coalitions raise two primary policy
justifications for permitting aggregation in Section 2 challenges:
(1) that it is illogical or even unconstitutional to insist on such
rigid distinctions between the races as opponents of aggregation
require, and (2) that aggregation would allow minority groups to
more easily meet the Gingles criteria to state a vote dilution
claim. Neither claim, however, can justify aggregation.
1. Opposing rigid distinctions between the races.
The first policy justification for aggregation is the one advanced by the majorities in LULAC I and Campos, which one pair
of commentators has summarized thus: "Combining Latinos and
African-Americans would seem to be a logical choice, since both
groups suffer from discrimination, are under-represented in government and are protected under the Voting Rights Act.""' As the
Nixon court noted, however, just because each group may have
faced discrimination does not mean that each group has faced the
same kind of discrimination.n This is especially true, the Nixon
court continued, when the findings regarding different groups are

'99Ancheta and Imahara, 27 USF L Rev at 822 (cited in note 9).
M Nixon, 76 F3d at 1391 ('Simply because Congress has found that African Americans have been discriminated against and because Congress has made the same finding
regarding Hispanic Americans, there is no basis for presuming such a finding regarding a
group consisting of a mixture of both minorities.").
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separated by a decade and the bases of the findings are differ201
ent.
Dissenting from the majority decision in Nixon, Judge Keith
stated a constitutionalized variation of this argument, characterizing the argument advanced by the Nixon court as a "racial purity test."20 The Nixon majority, he argued, unconstitutionally
distinguished between plaintiffs solely on the basis of race.203
Judge Keith suggested, 'Today, the majority further discriminates by compartmentalizing the discriminated against into segregated boxes from which their potential to participate fully in
political life is significantly diminished." ' Following in this same
vein, Professors Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan and Richard
Pildes point out in their 2001 casebook on the legal structure of
political
systems that Nixon "rests on a controversial vision of
"
'race.

'0

Other courts, they point out, have recognized the plastic-

ity of race and ethnicity, which are "as much a social construction
as a biological fact." In light of this plasticity, they question
whether the distinction between language and racial minorities is
tenable."
Keith, Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes are probably correct
that the distinctions among minority groups are artificial. But
the logic of civil rights enforcement demands the ability to somehow distinguish among races, however artificial those distinctions may be.0" For this reason federal census forms ask citizens
to check an otherwise arbitrary box, choosing a racial category.
Otherwise, how is a court to know how many "whites" and
"blacks" there are in a given jurisdiction in order to determine
whether the votes of "blacks" are being impermissibly diluted?
Certainly race is not so conceptually plastic that plaintiffs,
judges, and commentators find the distinction between whites
20

Id ("Congress found that African Americans had been disadvantaged specifically by

reason of race, while Hispanic Americans had been disadvantaged by reason of language
and education.").
202Id at 1401 (Keith dissenting).
'0' Id at 1399-1402 (Keith dissenting).
04
205

Nixon, 76 F3d at 1402 (Keith dissenting).
Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, The Law of Democracy at 795 (cited in note 186).
Id.

Id at 796.
See Donald Braman, Of Race and Immutability, 46 UCLA L Rev 1375, 1435 n 247
(1999) ("These legislatively-based priorities created the need among Federal agencies for
data for the specific population groups that historically had suffered discrimination and
differential treatment on the basis of race or ethnicity."), quoting Office of Management
and Budget, Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 60
Fed Reg 44674-75 (1995).
201

20

363]

MINORITY COALITION PLAINTIFFS AND THE VRA

397

and non-whites impossible to make. When the entire system of
VRA enforcement is predicated on artificial racial categories, it
makes no sense to pronounce that in certain VRA claims courts
are suddenly forbidden to maintain them.
2. Meeting the Gingles preconditions.
The second justification advanced by aggregation proponents
is that it permits protected groups to maintain Section 2 challenges in cases where they would otherwise be blocked by one of
the Gingles prongs of sufficiency and compactness, cohesiveness,
° As Judge Jones noted in her LULAC II
and white bloc voting.'O
concurrence, however, this position essentially begs the question
of whether such coalitions are permissible in the first place." '
This justification does nothing to answer the question of why it is
desirable to allow minority coalitions, rather than individual minority groups, to surmount the hurdles created by Gingles. Judge
Jones further argued that if a minority group lacks a common
race or ethnicity, any showing of political cohesion must rest primarily on "shared values, socioeconomic factors, and coalition
formation," the same things that unify political minorities.21' The
result would be to increase the possibility that courts will provide
a remedy that crosses the line between protection of racial minorities and mandating proportional representation,2 2 a remedy
specifically disavowed by Section 2. 2 ' As it is, the Gingles decision
has frequently been criticized as creating a strong bias toward
proportional representation, despite the Court's official affirma-

209 Schulte, Note, 1995 U III L Rev at 480-81 (cited in note 165).
2'0 LULAC 11, 999 F2d at 895 (Jones concurring) ("The second argument advanced
by a

court that permitted a minority coalition claim under Section 2 begs the question of statutory construction altogether. This position asserts that because a minority coalition may
meet the three-prong Gingles test, including the criterion of the minority group's political
cohesiveness, it may gain relief from vote dilution.").
211 LULAC 11, 999 F2d at 895 (Jones concurring), quoting LULAC 1, 812 F2d at 1504
(Higginbotham dissenting).
212 See LULAC 11, 999 F2d at 896 ("Permitting Section
2 claims by opportunistic minority coalitions, however, artificially escapes [the first Gingles] hurdle. As a result, the
remedy afforded to the coalition may easily cross the line from protecting minorities
against racial discrimination to the prohibited, and possibly unconstitutional, goal of
mandating proportional representation.").
213 42 USC § 1973(b) ("The extent to which members of a protected class have
been
elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered [in determining whether there has been a violation]: Provided, That nothing in
this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the population.").
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2
" As one commentator has noted,
tion of the Section 2 disclaimer..

however, that bias is at least restricted by the requirement that
there be "compact, cohesive, and sizable minority groups.".' Aggregation would allow minority coalitions to evade those minimal
constraints.
Schulte attempts to answer Judge Jones's proportional representation critique. He quotes Judge Jones's statement that Section 2 "expressly prohibit[s] proportional representation for minority groups."'1 From this he concludes, "Her words implied that
a cause of action exists under the Act if minorities achieve proportional representation.' " He further maintains that "[hier interpretation could not have been more incorrect. Although section
2 states that it creates no right to proportional representation, it
does not forbid it. Under the plain language of the Act, therefore,
section 2 remedies can strive to achieve proportional representation.

8

Schulte's argument, however, addresses a straw man that
evades the real criticism. The context of Judge Jones's statement
makes clear that she is not implying a Section 2 cause of action
against minorities that achieve proportional representation, nor
is she suggesting that minorities may not work to achieve proportional representation. In the same paragraph from which Schulte
draws the previous quotation, Judge Jones discusses the risk of a
"remedy" that incorporates the "prohibited, and possibly unconstitutional, goal of mandating proportional representation."'19 The
214 See Gingles, 478 US at 93 (O'Connor concurring) ("[Ellectoral
success has now
emerged, under the Court's standard, as the linchpin of vote dilution claims, and... the
elements of a vote dilution claim create an entitlement to roughly proportional representation within the framework of single-member districts."). See also Alexander Athan Yanos,
Note, Reconciling the Right to Vote with the Voting Rights Act, 92 Colum L Rev 1810, 1828
and n 88 (1992) (noting that "[diespite [the Gingles majority's failure to explicitly adopt a
bright-line rule mandating proportional representation], many commentators concluded
from the decision in Gingles that proportional representation had become the standard of
measure for determining the presence of minority vote dilution under Section 2 of the
Act," and citing to a number of commentators that have so concluded).
211 Mary A. Inman, Comment, C.P.R. (Change Through ProportionalRepresentation):
Resuscitating a Federal ElectoralSystem, 141 U Pa L Rev 1991, 2050-51 (1993) ("Despite
the 'no proportional representation' disclaimer of the 1982 Voting Rights Act Amendments
and the Court's proclaimed cognizance of it, the core value underlying Gingles['] three
preconditions is a right to proportional representation -but only for compact, cohesive,
and sizable minority groups.") (footnotes omitted).
216 Schulte, Note, 1995 U Ill L Rev at 470 (cited in note 165), quoting LULAC 11, 999
F2d at 895 (Jones concurring).
...Schulte, Note, 1995 U Ill L Rev at 470 (cited in note 165).
"18

Id.

2" LULAC 1!, 999 F2d at 896 (Jones concurring) (emphasis added).
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problem is not with minorities who succeed at the ballot box in
numbers roughly proportional to their population, but with
judges who mandate proportional representation, which Section 2
specifically disavows. Indeed, Schulte's basic premise is flawed; it
is a well-established principle of law that, just because the law
does not forbid an action (achieving proportional representation),
it does not then inevitably follow that courts may mandate that
result or require others (such as the defendant jurisdictions) to
further the plaintiffs' aim.22° This would especially seem to be the
case when Congress has expressly disclaimed an intention to impose such a mandate. Put another way, it is entirely probable
that Judge Jones would agree with Schulte's conclusion if he had
stated it thus: "Under the plain language of the Act, therefore,
minorities can strive to achieve proportional representation."
Schulte further notes that aggregation does not logically require proportional representation.221' That is arguably true, strictly
speaking, but it misses the point of the critique. The claim that
Schulte fails to address is that the entire Section 2 framework as
interpreted by Gingles is strongly biased toward proportional representation, even though the law and Gingles officially disclaimed
it. The first Gingles prong is one of the few barriers to wholesale
proportional representation, thereby at least minimally preserving the fine line that Congress walked between codifying the results standard for vote dilution claims and avoiding mandating

220

For examples of courts making a distinction between requiring an act and simply

not forbidding it, see Thomas v Arn, 474 US 140, 148-49 (1985) ("However, we need not
decide whether the [Federal Magistrates Act, 28 USC § 636] mandates a waiver of appellate review absent objections. We hold only that it does not forbid such a rule."); Vanderbilt v Vanderbilt, 354 US 416, 432-33 n 2 (1957) (Harlan dissenting) ("It is easier to have
a flat rule than to make distinctions based on judgment. Yet, from the standpoint of partitioning power among the several states, there may well be wisdom in having a gap between what due process will not forbid and what full faith and credit will not require.
Certainly in suits over property and money there may be grounds that are thought good
enough to justify a state in exerting its power so far as it relies wholly on its own strength
and yet not so good that other states should be bound to lend a hand."), quoting T. R. Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 Harv L Rev 930, 936 (1945). The Court has also recognized
the inverse proposition (albeit in a rather controversial setting): just because the law does
not impose a burden (as opposed to creating a right), it does not follow that private actors
cannot assume that burden (as opposed to gaining the benefit in the VRA context). See
generally United Steelworkers v Weber, 443 US 193 (1979) (holding that, though Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically disavowed a requirement of affirmative action
to remedy past wrongs, it did not forbid private actors to implement such a program).
221 Schulte, Note, 1995 U Ill L Rev at 470 (cited at note 165) ("Not only does section 2
not forbid proportional minority representation, but aggregation does not demand proportional representation.").
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proportional representation."' Aggregation breaks down that barrier, thus upsetting the balance and violating Congress's clearly
stated intention of avoiding that result.
IV. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A BRIGHT-LINE RULE AGAINST
MINORITY COALITIONS

At least one commentator, Rick G. Strange, has suggested
that the best way to address the difficult question of minority coalitions is to permit minority coalitions, but at the same time to
establish a heightened standard of cohesiveness for the plaintiff
class beyond that which the Gingles framework already demands2 Strange would have a proposed coalition plaintiff class
demonstrate similar socio-economic status, similar attitudes toward "significant issues affecting the challenged entity," and a
history of supporting the same candidates before even reaching
the Gingles standards. 22 The idea is to significantly limit the circumstances in which coalition plaintiffs would be possible, thus
avoiding many of the instances in which it could be used improperly, while still allowing the most meritorious plaintiffs to reap
the benefits of aggregation. This approach is surely appealing as
an initial matter. Bright-line rules always present the risk of doing injustice in the individual case,225 whereas malleable standards hold out the possibility, at least, of allowing judges to tailor
cases to individual circumstances. 22" Nevertheless, the nature and
mechanics of cases under the VRA make a "standards" approach
to aggregation particularly troublesome, regardless of the merits
of discretion generally.
As previous commentators have noted, there comes a point at
which tailored standards become so numerous and indeterminate
222 See LULAC 11, 999 F2d at 895 (Jones concurring) ("One may
be uncertain what
Congress might think about permitting minority coalitions to assert vote dilution claims,
but Congress clearly walked a fine line in amending Section 2 to codify the results test for
vote dilution claims while expressly prohibiting proportional representation for minority
groups.").
"3
See, for example, Strange, 20 Tex Tech L Rev at 95 (cited in note 9) (arguing for
permitting aggregation, but only once the plaintiff class has met a heightened burden of
proof with respect to the cohesiveness of the proposed coalition).
224 Id at 129.
225 See, for example, Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the FourthAmendment,
83 Mich
L Rev 1468, 1484 (1985) (advocating a reasonableness "standard" in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, rather than the current exclusionary rule).
22' Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, the Rules/Standards
Dilemma and the Line Item Veto, 44 Vill L Rev 189, 199 (1999) ("Standards set forth factors for decisions made on a case-by-case basis.").
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as to give possible litigants no idea of what the law is.7 Each case
comes to be decided upon its particular facts and consequently
has less value as precedent or as a means of putting citizens (or
here, jurisdictions) on notice as to what the law expects of them.
Section 2 cases already lean strongly toward the fact-specific, limited-precedent side of the spectrum."' Another standard, as opposed to a rule, would only increase the immense uncertainty
that parties already face in litigating VRA cases.
The fact-specific nature of VRA cases results largely from 42
USC § 1973(b), which instructs courts to judge vote dilution according to a "totality of circumstances" standard. As the Second
Circuit recently noted, "This standard is exceptionally vague. One
has almost no guidance as to what illegally lessens the opportunity to vote."' Further contributing to this difficulty is the fact
that Section 2 disavows the two easily administrable standardsintent-based violations on the one hand or proportional representation on the other. 13 Perhaps recognizing this difficulty, the Senate Judiciary Committee's report that accompanied the 1982
amendments to the VRA ("Senate Report") 2 listed nine factors
that courts might consider as relevant to the totality of circumstances analysis." The Supreme Court adopted these guidelines
227 See

id at 200-01 ("Standards frustrate the rule of law. They undermine citizens'

interests in knowing their rights and responsibilities before, rather than after, they act.");
see generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U Chi L Rev 1175,

1180 (1989) (arguing that judicial crafting of law in the form of rules rather than standards is essential to the concept of the "rule of law").
= See Gingles, 478 US at 79 ('This determination [of whether a violation of Section 2
has been committed] is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case ... and requires
'an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact' of the contested electoral mechanisms.").
22942 USC § 1973(b).
220
231

Goosby v Town Bd of the Town of Hempstead, 180 F3d 476, 500 (2d Cir 1999).

See text accompanying notes 147 and 213.
Senate Report, 1982 USCCAN at 177 (cited in note 146).

232See
M3

Id at 206-07:

1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to
vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is
racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination
against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group
have been denied access to that process;
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in Gingles.34 But, as the Gingles Court recognized, the Senate
Report itself limits the usefulness of these factors. 35 The Senate
Report factors do not purport to be an exhaustive list of relevant
considerations."' The Report states that "there is no requirement
that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a major2 37
ity of them point one way or the other."
Rather, courts must undertake a "searching practical evaluation of the past and present
reality" and take a "functional view of the political process. ' M
The result of these vague guidelines is demonstrated by cases
such as Jenkins v Red Clay ConsolidatedSchool DistrictBoard of
Education,2'9 in which a number of Senate factors favored the
plaintiffs while others favored the defendants, and the district
court was left to decide how to weigh the factors to reach a decision. A court in this instance must decide which factors should be
accorded greater weight.' 9 It must determine why some factors
are weightier than others. However, judges have nothing to guide
them in making those difficult and often arbitrary decisions. It is
beyond the scope of this Comment to address these questions, but

5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and
health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public
office in the jurisdiction.
Additional factors that in some cases have had probative value as part of plaintiffs'
evidence to establish a violation are:
[8.1 whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials
to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group.
[9.1 whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting
qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.
234 Gingles, 478 US at 36-37.
235 Id at 46 ("[T]he Senate Report espouses a flexible, fact-intensive
test for § 2 violations.").
22
Senate Report, 1982 USCCAN at 207 (cited in note 146) ("While these enumerated
factors will often be the most relevant ones, in some cases other factors will be indicative
of the alleged dilution.").
237

Id.

Gingles, 478 US at 45, quoting Senate Report, 1982 USCCAN at 207 (cited in note
146) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29 1996 US Dist LEXIS 4747 (D Del), affd as Jenkins v
Manning, 116 F3d 685 (3d Cir
1997).
240 Id at *57-*79 (holding that there was no violation of Section 2 in a case where the
court found that Senate Factors 1, 2, 5, 8 & 9 leaned in favor of a finding of a violation,
while Factors 3, 4, 6 & 7 weighed against such a finding).
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they do serve to demonstrate the substantial difficulties that already complicate VRA cases.
When it comes to giving cities and states guidelines by which
to establish and conduct their electoral systems, voting rights
cases are among the most cryptic. Indeed, Professor Karlan has
analogized the recent line of Supreme Court voting rights cases to
the awkward period of obscenity jurisprudence' between Redrup
v New York 42 and Miller v California, in which the Court "summarily decid[ed] obscenity cases without developing any legal
standards that the lower courts could readily apply."24 In such a
chaotic context, throwing an additional standard (rather than a
rule) into the precedential mix would further complicate this area
of the law.' Courts cannot avoid the vagueness of the totality of
circumstances test; the language of 42 USC § 1973(b) demands
it. 21 Courts can, however, avoid making the situation worse by

refusing to graft new, judicially-crafted standards into voting
rights law.
V. MINORITY COALITIONS WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN SUITS

ALLEGING EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS

By deciding that the statutory provisions of the VRA do not
extend to minority coalitions, the courts are by no means determining what is required or forbidden in claims alleging violations
of constitutional guarantees. The courts would only determine the
question of the class of citizens for whom Congress afforded
statutory protections greater than those guaranteed under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and un-

'A'See Pamela

S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-

Shaw Era, 26 Cumb L Rev 287, 288 (1996) ("The Court has apparently set itself upon a
course of 'Redrupping' congressional districts: reviewing challenged districts one by one
and issuing opinions that depend so idiosyncratically on the unique facts of each case that
they provide no real guidance to either lower courts or legislatures.") (footnotes omitted).
242 386 US 767 (1967).
2
244
245

413 US 15 (1973).

Karlan, 26 Cumb L Rev at 288 n 7 (cited in note 241).
It should be noted that in litigation under the VRA, standards often represent an

improvement-an increase in certainty over the completely open-ended nature of the
"totality of the circumstances" test. This was certainly the case in Gingles. But this Section
does not discuss the merits of standards as compared with nothing at all. This Section
argues that a rule would lessen uncertainty to a greater degree than a standard, and the
nature of VRA litigation is such that even a little more certainty would represent an improvement.
246 See text accompanying note 229.
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der the Fifteenth Amendment.2 1 7 A vote dilution claim under these

Amendments is very similar to a vote dilution claim under Section 2,' except that, as noted above, a constitutional claim of vote
dilution requires proof of discriminatory intent." If a jurisdiction
were to intentionally discriminate against a coalition of minorities, it would be perverse to prohibit that coalition from bringing
an action against the jurisdiction. The worry that innocent actors
would be caught up in such an intent-based action is greatly reduced, if not eliminated, as courts would likely dismiss frivolous
claims against good faith jurisdictions at the summary judgment
stage. That such risks are lessened becomes especially clear when
compared to the strict liability regime of Section 2's results test. 4
In addition to avoiding the overexpansion of a strict liability
regime that burdens innocent actors, permitting minority coalitions in constitutional actions avoids a number of the other concerns raised by this Comment. First, the question of whether
Congress spoke clearly on the matter of minority coalitions is beside the point in the equal protection context; courts avoid the
controversy over statutory interpretation of the VRA because
they interpret only the Constitution. The federalism concerns of
Gregory are irrelevant in actions under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as opposed to legislation passed pursuant to
Congress's authority under them. As Gregory recognized, "those
2A7Already there are indisputably a number of groups and individuals
who are not

protected by the provisions of the VRA, but who may bring vote dilution actions under the
Constitution. The VRA only applies to vote dilution on the basis of race, so political parties, for example, must bring any claims under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See Smith v Boyle, 144 F3d 1060, 1069 n 9 (7th Cir 1998) (Flaum concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[P]olitical parties are not covered by the Voting Rights
Act.").
141 Prior to 1982, vote dilution claims were almost
always constitutional claims, since
Section 2 was regarded as a restatement of, and co-extensive with, the Fifteenth Amendment. See Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, The Law of Democracy at 747 (cited in note 186)
("Section 2 was virtually never used [before 1982]: prior to Washington v. Davis and Nevett
v. Sides, there was little reason to suppose the statutory standard was more protective
than the constitutional one, and the plurality opinion in Bolden found that section 2
merely restated the constitutional prohibition."). The 1982 amendments to Section 2 were
regarded primarily as a way of returning to the constitutional standard that had prevailed
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55, 62 (1980),
which established a discriminatory intent requirement. See Senate Report, 1982 USCCAN
at 192 (cited in note 146) ("The proposed amendment to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act
is designed to restore the legal standard that governed voting discrimination cases prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Bolden.").
"9 Bolden, 446 US at 62 ("The Court's more recent decisions confirm the principle that
racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment
violation.").
00 See text accompanying note 146.
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'Amendments were specifically designed as an expansion of federal power and an intrusion on state sovereignty."' As far as the
protection of those constitutional provisions extends, the Constitution itself displaces federalism concerns. It is only when Congress goes beyond the protections of the Amendments that federalism concerns have force.
Similarly, in constitutional challenges, the argument that
costly lawsuits and complex systems administration unduly encumber jurisdictions has less force than in the VRA context.
Unlike VRA cases, the safe harbor to avoid a constitutional vote
dilution challenge is very clear. States may not intentionally degrade the right of any citizen to vote. Finally, the question of the
effect of Section 2 on the burden-shifting framework of Section 5
becomes moot. That framework, as opposed to vote dilution challenges, is a creature of statute. No one would suggest that the
constitutional amendments require such a regime.5" 3
Admittedly, the question of defensive aggregation still arises
in constitutional vote dilution cases, at least theoretically. The
defendant jurisdiction could claim that it did not intend to harm
blacks or Hispanics, for example, but to help them as a coalition.
Courts need not blindly accept this claim, however. It would have
to be well established in the legislative record accompanying the
proposed voting change. In constitutional cases subject to heightened scrutiny, like vote dilution cases alleging discriminatory
intent,2 u courts are required to engage in a close examination to
be certain that "[t]he justification [is] genuine, not hypothesized
or invented post hoc in response to litigation." "
Permitting aggregation in constitutional cases would mitigate, somewhat, the impact of forbidding them in the VRA context, and do so without many of the problems that VRA litigation
creates. It is true that the standard of proof is difficult to meet,
but a constitutional cause of action provides no less protection for
a minority coalition than it does for any nonracial coalition that
251

501 US at 468, quoting City of Rome, 446 US at 179.

252 See Bolden, 446 US at 62.

213See, for example, South Carolina v Katzenbach, 383 US 301 (1966) (discussing
Congress's authority to enact such a regime under Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment).
See Hunt v Cromartie, 526 US 541, 547 (1999) ("[In this context, strict scrutiny
applies if race was the 'predominant factor' motivating the legislature's districting decision.").
255 United States v Virginia, 518 US 515, 533 (1996)
(stating that the Virginia's
justifications for maintaining the Virginia Military Institute as a men-only institution
against a gender discrimination claim "must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post
hoc in response to litigation.").
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states a vote dilution claim."" And if Congress believes that such
protection is inadequate, they could always amend the VRA to
expand the protections contained within it.
CONCLUSION

If Congress wanted to extend the protections of the VRA to
include minority coalitions, it could presumably exercise its constitutional authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments and do so." ' In the absence of a clear statement that
it has made such an extension, however, courts should hesitate to
extend the VRA's provisions to new, hybrid classes of citizens.
Because Congress substituted a results test in vote dilution cases
for the constitutional requirement of discriminatory intent, the
impact of reading the VRA more broadly than the language of
Section 2 demands could be devastating to innocent jurisdictions
trying to comply with the VRA. Such a reading could damage the
Constitution's federalist system and deplete state and local coffers. Furthermore, plaintiffs could see aggregation turned against
them by bad faith defendants opportunistically using a convenient record of a temporary political alliances between otherwise
non-cohesive minority groups.
Concern for these results ought to lead courts to adopt a
bright-line prohibition of minority coalitions, rather than relying
on standards to allow minority coalitions in select circumstances.
The vagueness Congress created in Section 2 cases by choosing
the totality of circumstances test makes this field of law an unappealing candidate for yet another series of standards.
Notably, rejecting minority coalitions under the VRA does
not foreclose their use in claims alleging constitutional violations.
Indeed, many of the policy arguments that militate against minority coalitions in VRA cases have less force in direct constitutional challenges. Allowing aggregation in this context softens the
impact of prohibiting them in the VRA context.
As Justice Scalia has noted, in the VRA Congress provided "a
powerful, albeit sometimes blunt, weapon with which to attack

25 See text accompanying note 247.
257As noted above, the constitutionality of Congress's 1982 Amendments
has never

been explicitly decided, so the validity of further revisions can only be presumed, rather
than assured. See note 148. See also Issacharoff, Karlan & Pildes, The Law of Democracy
at 859-66 (cited in note 186) (summarizing the debate over the constitutionality of the
amended Section 2).
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even the most subtle forms of discrimination." ' And there is no
question that the VRA was passed in response to the real and
disturbing problem of racial discrimination in voting. In rooting
out such malfeasance, however, it is important to remember the
costs that accompany the VRA's departure from the constitutional baseline, and not to allow a narrowly tailored remedial
statute to be turned into "some all-purpose weapon for wellintentioned judges to wield as they please in the battle against
discrimination.' 5 Where Congress has not clearly authorized interference with state electoral systems, as they have not in the
case of minority coalitions, courts should refrain from authorizing
it for them.

2

259

Chisom, 501 US at 406 (Scalia dissenting).

Id at 404.

